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Abstract
We analyze the role of electricity storage for technological innovations in electricity
generation. We propose a directed technological change model of the electricity sector,
where innovative firms develop better electricity storage solutions, which affect not only
the relative competitiveness between renewable and nonrenewable electricity sources
but also the ease with which they can be substituted. Using a global firm-level data
set of electricity patents from 1963 to 2011, we empirically analyze the determinants
of innovation in electricity generation, and the role of storage in directing innovation.
Our results show that electricity storage increases innovation not only in renewables
but also in conventional technologies. This implies that efforts to increase innovation in
storage can benefit conventional, fossil fuel-fired electricity plants as well as increasing
the use of renewable electricity.
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1 Introduction
Concerns over climate change have led society to seek alternatives to reduce carbon emissions.
To that end, many call for a shift in energy production from fossil fuels toward renewables.
Although renewable energy can provide a clean source of electricity, fossil fuels still account
for the vast majority of the world’s electricity generation.1 As a consequence, electricity
generation is currently the single largest carbon emitter globally, and with energy demands
continuing to grow rapidly, innovation in the electricity sector is an important channel for
curbing carbon emissions. Although innovation has already resulted in new and improved
renewable technologies, efficient electricity storage is often considered to be a key innovation
challenge for meeting renewable goals because cheap, large-scale storage solutions can boost
the use of intermittent renewable energy in the grid mix.
Our main goal is to study the role of electricity storage in the electricity sector. Specifi-
cally, we ask three questions. First, how do better storage technologies affect innovation in
electricity generation? Second, how does innovation in electricity generation affect technolog-
ical advancements in storage? Finally, what is the impact of fossil-fuel prices on innovation?
To answer these questions, we develop a stylized theoretical model of directed technolog-
ical change, where innovation in electricity storage improves the elasticity of substitution
between conventional and renewable electricity production. Then, we test our theoretical
predictions using a global firm-level database of patents related to electricity generation and
storage from 1963 to 2011.
The most widely used form of electricity storage is pumped hydro, which accounts for over
90% of the current global storage capacity and has been used commercially since the 1890s.
However, current innovation efforts mainly target other technologies, including batteries or
compressed air storage, because the potential to expand the use of traditional pumped-
hydro storage is limited by the availability of suitable sites. Many of these initiatives seek
a breakthrough in batteries, but governments and private companies also direct innovation
efforts to a multitude of other possible solutions.2 These include ways to use cheap and
1According to the International Energy Agency, in 2013, 67.2% of world electricity production came from
conventional fossil fuel-powered plants. Hydroelectric plants provided 16.6%, nuclear plants 10.6%, biofuels
and waste 2.0%, and the rest came from geothermal, solar, wind, and other sources (IEA, 2015).
2Indeed, the media describe the occurrence of a technology race in electricity storage, with scien-
tists searching for game-changing solutions to the challenge of efficiently storing electricity. See, for ex-
ample, “How energy storage can change everything” by Daniel Burrus (http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/daniel-burrus/how-energy-storage-can-ch_b_8010258.html) or “Innovation sputters in bat-
tle against climate change” by Eduardo Porter (http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/22/business/
energy-environment/innovation-to-stanch-climate-change-sputters.html).
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easily available materials, including air and water, as the storage media (e.g., compressed
air, flywheels, and pumped hydro), hydrogen-based technologies, and electrical and thermal
storage.
One important feature of electricity markets is the requirement to maintain grid balance
at all times. Unfortunately, conventional and renewable electricity sources are not perfect
substitutes in ensuring grid balance because of the intermittency of renewable energy. How-
ever, once electricity generating firms have access to affordable, large-scale storage solutions,
intermittent renewable energy can become as flexible as conventional (fossil-fuel based) en-
ergy in balancing the grid. Indeed, the capacity to store electricity is the key component
that links electricity generation to its delivery. Hence, electricity storage mitigates another
key challenge in electricity markets: balancing the grid when there are large fluctuations in
consumption across the day and the week.
As storage provides greater flexibility to meet variable demands, regardless of the energy
source, it can provide benefits to both conventional and renewable electricity producers.
Storing electricity efficiently can enable full exploitation of the energy potential in intermit-
tent renewables, as producers can simply produce as much electricity as the sun and the wind
offer at all times, store it, and dispatch it to the grid when needed. In addition, efficient
storage technologies can create new arbitrage possibilities for conventional electricity produc-
ers, because storage enables them to produce at a fairly constant rate, thereby minimizing
ramping and other costs, to store the electricity, and to dispatch it during peak periods.
Thus, both renewable and conventional electricity producers can profit from electricity stor-
age solutions. Given this, we study the incentives to develop better storage solutions and
their role in fostering innovation in renewable and conventional generation.
We start by theoretically analyzing the drivers of innovation in the electricity sector. Our
innovation model builds on the directed technological change framework used by Acemoglu
et al. (2012) and Aghion et al. (2016). Specifically, we model three types of innovation:
innovation in renewable electricity generation, innovation in conventional electricity gener-
ation, and innovation in electricity storage. Innovation in electricity generation increases
efficiency and results in cost savings, whereas innovation in storage improves the elasticity
of substitution between renewable and conventional electricity production. The theoretical
contribution of our paper is to propose an endogenous process to improve the elasticity of
substitution in a directed technological change model.
We find that better storage solutions promote innovation in both renewable and con-
ventional electricity when the two production processes are substitutes. Hence, better elec-
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tricity storage technologies not only benefit renewable energy production but also benefit
conventional production, by creating incentives to develop better fossil-fuel technologies. In
addition, we show how better electricity generation technologies affect the incentives to in-
novate in the electricity sector. Then, we empirically evaluate our theoretical predictions
and quantify the effect of storage on innovation.
To conduct our empirical analysis, we first build a global firm-level data set of electricity
patents. We focus on Triadic patents, which are patents filed in all of the three major patent
offices: the European Patent Office (EPO), the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO),
and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO). In total, we identify 19,232 unique Triadic patent
applications for electricity storage, 154,041 for conventional technologies, and 178,841 for
renewable technologies. In addition to the patent data, we use data on energy prices and
macroeconomic variables. Altogether, our data set covers 13,877 firms, across 79 countries,
for a period from 1963 to 2011. Guided by the theoretical analysis, we use the data set to es-
timate the probability of innovation in the three technologies using information on the firms’
past innovations, knowledge spillovers from other firms, energy prices, and macroeconomic
indicators as explanatory variables.
Our empirical results confirm that the development of new storage technologies promotes
innovations in both conventional and renewable technologies. Hence, electricity storage not
only benefits renewables, by mitigating the intermittency problem, but also encourages the
development of efficiency-improving fossil-fuel technologies; for example, by allowing con-
ventional power plants to reduce ramping costs. In addition, we find evidence for a positive
feedback effect between innovation in storage and in renewable generation. Our results im-
ply that the development of large-scale electricity storage, by increasing the flexibility to
meet demand at all times, improves efficiency in electricity generation. Although it has been
widely argued that electricity storage is a key solution to reducing carbon emissions in the
electricity sector, this is the first paper to provide evidence that better storage not only will
improve the potential for renewable technologies but also will boost the efficiency of the
entire electricity sector.
Our study contributes to the literature studying energy prices, induced innovation, and
economic growth (see e.g. Popp, 2002, 2004, 2006b; Acemoglu et al., 2012, 2013; Aghion
et al., 2016).3 In particular, our work has several similarities with Acemoglu et al. (2012),
3Acemoglu et al. (2012); Bovenberg and Smulders (1995, 1996); Goulder and Schneider (1999) theoretically
analyze directed technological change and the environment. In addition, there is an extensive empirical
literature studying the incentives to innovate in the energy sector; see, for example, Buonanno et al. (2003);
Popp (2002, 2005); Calel and Dechezlepreˆtre (2012); Dechezlepreˆtre and Glachant (2014); Gans (2012), and
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who present a theoretical framework for studying induced innovation in the energy sector. We
contribute to this theoretical literature by proposing an endogenous mechanism for improv-
ing the substitutability between conventional and renewable technologies through innovation
using the directed technological change framework. Our empirical analysis is related most
closely to the studies by Aghion et al. (2016) and Noailly and Smeets (2015), which quantify
firm-level incentives to direct technological innovations toward renewable technologies in dif-
ferent sectors. Whereas Aghion et al. (2016) focus on innovation in the automobile industry,
Noailly and Smeets (2015) analyze the electricity sector. Our paper differs from the latter
study in that we explicitly analyze the role of electricity storage in this sector and examine
how better storage affects innovation in electricity generation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our theoretical
model. In section 3, we explain how we build our unique data set and present descriptive
statistics. Section 4 describes our empirical strategy, and section 5 discusses our estimation
results. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical framework
In this section, we develop and analyze a directed technological change model of the electricity
sector, where innovation in electricity storage improves the substitutability of renewable and
conventional technologies. The directed technological change framework, first introduced by
Acemoglu (2002), and later applied to the environment by Acemoglu et al. (2012), analyzes
how renewable and conventional technologies evolve over time. Aghion et al. (2016) use this
framework to study brown versus green innovation in the automobile industry. We build
on this approach to explain innovation in the electricity sector. The novelty of our model
is that we endogenize the elasticity of substitution between renewable and conventional
technologies. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to study an endogenous
process for improving the substitutability between two types of production using the directed
technological change framework.
Without storage solutions, it is not feasible for intermittent renewable energy to con-
tribute a large share of electricity to the grid, as this would require a large overcapacity of
renewables to ensure grid balance and, thus, energy security, at all times. For this reason,
intermittent renewable electricity production relies on a buffer of conventional generation to
balance the grid. In this setting, limited storage solutions imply that conventional electricity
Hassler et al. (2012).
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generation is a complement to intermittent renewable energy. Fortunately, the development
of better storage offers a solution to this issue by improving the substitutability between
renewable and conventional electricity generation by decoupling the production of energy
from its consumption. Hence, with storage solutions, renewable electricity production can
overcome the intermittency problem and become a substitute for, rather than a complement
to, conventional production. This is our motivation for modeling innovation in electricity
storage as an endogenous mechanism that improves the elasticity of substitution between re-
newable and conventional electricity generation. In addition, we model innovation that yields
efficiency gains and, thus, lower production costs, in renewable and conventional electricity
generation.
We develop a one-period model, where consumers obtain utility from electricity and
an aggregate outside good. Firms that are price and technology taking produce electricity
from renewable and conventional sources.4 We make two distinctions between renewable and
conventional electricity. First, all renewable resources, unlike nonrenewables, are intermittent
(e.g., wind and solar). Second, energy inputs into renewable production are free (wind and
sun), whereas conventional electricity generation uses costly fossil fuels.
With this model, we show that the development of better electricity storage technologies
provides two benefits to the electricity sector. First, it boosts renewable electricity genera-
tion because decoupling electricity production from consumption alleviates the intermittency
issue.5 Second, electricity storage makes the electricity market more flexible, which bene-
fits conventional producers who can exploit arbitrage possibilities and reduce their ramping
costs. This leads to more innovation in efficiency-improving conventional technologies and
greater flexibility to meet demand at all times. Thus, the development of better electricity
storage technologies promotes greater efficiency in the entire electricity sector, as we show
analytically in the following sections.
4This implies deregulated electricity markets, which have been seen to yield close to perfect competition
as long as there are two or more competing electricity retailers.
5Note that hydropower is a significant exception to our framework because we assume that renewable
electricity generation comes only from intermittent resources. In reality, hydropower producers have the
ability to store energy for later dispatch. For example, Danish wind power production relies on Norwegian
hydropower as a buffer. However, owing to the high utilization of available hydropower resources, little room
is left for expansion, and consequently, further growth in renewable energy must come from other sources
that are likely to be intermittent. For this reason, we exclude hydropower from our theoretical analysis.
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2.1 The model
Consider an economy with a continuum of consumers who spend their fixed income on
electricity and an aggregate outside good c0 (the numeraire) to maximize utility.
6 The
utility function is quasi-linear with respect to c0 and takes the following form:
U = c0 +
β
β − 1Y
β−1
β , (1)
where Y =
∫
Yidi is aggregate electricity consumption, with i representing a continuum
of consumers, and β is the elasticity of substitution between electricity and the aggregate
consumption good.
Innovation affects both the efficiency of electricity generation and the ease of substitution
between renewable and conventional electricity. Firms invest in technological innovation at
the beginning of the period, before they produce with the improved technologies at the end
of the period.7 Firms take the initial state of technologies as given, and decide how much
to invest in R&D to maximize their profits. The firms’ innovations lead to cost savings
from more efficient technologies in the end-of-period production stage. Given price and
technology taking firms (perfect markets), we can derive the equilibrium levels of innovation
and production.
The cost of innovation effort xj is
1
2
ψjx
2
j , for technology type j = s, c, r, where ψ is a
positive constant and subscripts s, c, and r denote electricity storage, conventional (fossil
fuel), and renewable electricity generation, whereas the cost is measured in terms of the
aggregate consumption good. The impact of innovation in a given technology is:
Aj = (1 + xj)Aj0, for j = s, c, r, (2)
where Aj0 ≥ 0 denotes the initial efficiency of the technology, and Aj is the technology after
innovation.
The costs of conventional and renewable electricity generation depend on available tech-
nologies, as follows:
φjgjYj
Aj
, for j = c, r, with gc = f ≥ 1 and gr = 1, where Yc and Yr are
conventional and renewable electricity production, φj, j = c, d are positive constants, and f
is the fossil fuel price. The parameter gj indicates electricity generation that relies on costly
6On the demand side, we assume that consumers consider electricity to be a homogenous product. Hence,
we abstract from any consumer preferences for renewable over nonrenewable electricity.
7Within our static framework, there are no spillover effects of R&D activities. We relax this assumption
in the empirical section, where we account for knowledge spillovers.
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fossil fuel inputs, in contrast to renewable sources.
Before dispatching electricity to consumers, retailers (or utilities) aggregate electricity
from conventional and renewable sources according to the following production function:
Y =
(
Y
(As)−1
(As)
r + Y
(As)−1
(As)
c
) (As)
(As)−1
, (3)
where  = (As) ∈ [0,+∞〉 is the elasticity of substitution between renewable and con-
ventional electricity. We assume that the elasticity of substitution depends linearly on the
efficiency of the storage technology: (As) = 0As, where 0 is a positive constant. The
inputs are complements when (As) < 1 and substitutes when (As) > 1. Thus, innovation
in renewable and conventional technologies lowers the cost of generating electricity, whereas
innovation in storage technologies improves the substitutability between electricity produced
by renewable and conventional generators.
2.2 Equilibrium
To solve for the model’s equilibrium, we first derive the demand for electricity from the con-
sumers’ problem.8 Using this demand function, we solve the electricity production problem,
which occurs at the end of the period. Finally, we calculate the industry’s equilibrium in-
vestment in research by solving the innovation problem at the beginning of the period, given
the solution of the production problem. Our goal is to analyze the drivers of innovation in
electricity storage and in conventional and renewable generation.
Consumers maximize utility with respect to their use of electricity, Y :
max
Y
c0 +
β
β − 1Y
β−1
β , (4)
subject to m = c0 +PY , where m is the available budget and P is the electricity price. The
optimality condition of the problem simplifies to the following demand function:
Y = P−β. (5)
8This equilibrium represents a social planner’s solution as well as the market outcome, as we abstract
from externalities.
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2.2.1 End-of-period production problem
To determine how much to invest in innovation at the beginning of the period, firms consider
the value of having better technologies in the production stage, which takes place at the end
of the period. Therefore, we begin by solving the electricity production problem:
max
Yr,Yc
P
(
Y
(As)−1
(As)
r + Y
(As)−1
(As)
c
) (As)
(As)−1
− φr
Ar
Yr − φcf
Ac
Yc, (6)
where P is given because firms take prices as given. Note that, at this stage, all technologies
are fixed (Aj, j = s, c, r).
After some manipulation of the first-order conditions, we obtain the optimal production
level of renewable and conventional electricity:
Yj = Y
(
φjgj
Aj
)−(As)
P (As), j = c, r. (7)
Using the electricity demand function (5), the optimal production of electricity from fossil
fuels and renewables (7) becomes:
Yj =
(
φjgj
Aj
)−(As)
P (As)−β, j = c, r, (8)
which is identical to the market equilibrium.
2.2.2 Beginning-of-period innovation problem
To solve the beginning-of-period innovation problem, we substitute the optimal electricity
production for a given technology level into the aggregate profit function. This yields the
following objective function for the innovation problem:
Π =P
(
F (1−)c P
(−β)(−1)
 + F (1−)r P
(−β)(−1)

) 
−1
− F 1−c P −β − F 1−r P −β −
1
2
∑
j=s,c,r
ψjx
2
j ,
where Π is aggregate industry profits, Fj ≡ φjgjAj for j = c, r, F ≡ F
1−(As)
r + F
1−(As)
c , and
where we have dropped the argument As from the  function to simplify notation. This
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expression simplifies to:
Π = P −β
[
PF

−1
]
− 1
2
∑
j=s,c,r
ψjx
2
j . (9)
To find the equilibrium level of innovation in renewable, conventional, and storage technolo-
gies, we maximize equation (9) subject to each technology’s innovation constraint (2). Doing
this, we can express the optimality condition for innovation in storage, xs, as:
ψsxsP
β−
0As0
= lnP
(
PF

−1 − F
)
+ F 1−c lnFc + F
1−
r lnFr
+ PF

−1
{(

− 1
)
F rFc lnFc + FrF

c lnFr
FrF c + F

rFc
+
lnF
(− 1)2
}
, (10)
where we have used the definition of (As) and equation (2) to substitute for
∂
∂xs
= 0As0.
Similarly, we can express the optimality condition for innovation in electricity generation
as:
ψjxjP
β− =
(
PF
1
−1 + 1− 
)
F 1−j
(
Aj0
Aj
)
, j = c, r. (11)
Note that , Aj, and Fj in the equation system (10) and (11) are functions of innovation,
xj, and that we cannot solve explicitly for the equilibrium values of innovation. Instead, the
highly nonlinear equation system (10) and (11) implicitly defines the equilibrium levels of
innovation in the three technologies. These equations show that innovation in equilibrium
depends on past innovation, the elasticity of substitution between conventional and renewable
electricity, and energy prices. Next, we carry out comparative statics to analyze the drivers
of innovation in more detail.
2.3 Determinants of innovation in equilibrium
As the equilibrium is given by the highly nonlinear and implicit equation system (10) and
(11), we numerically analyze the comparative statics for innovation. We focus on three key
variables that affect innovation: the elasticity of substitution, which is equivalent to past
innovation in electricity storage technologies (0 and As0); past innovation in generation
(Aj0, j = r, c); and the fuel price (f). Table 1 below and Figure A.1 in the appendix sum-
marize how each of these factors affects innovation in renewable, conventional, and storage
technologies, when conventional and renewable production are complements and substitutes,
respectively.
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Table 1: Comparative statics: Innovation drivers.
Innovation in Renewable Conventional Storage
Initial elasticity of subst., As00 Compl. Subs. Compl. Subs. Compl. Subs.
Initial storage technology, As0 − + − + − −
Initial renewable technology, Ar0 − +→ − + − + +→ −
Initial conventional technology, Ac0 + − − +→ − + +→ −
Fuel price, f − + + +→ − − +→ −
We are primarily interested in three relationships: first, how the current electricity storage
technology affects innovation in conventional and renewable generation; second, the feedback
effect of improved generation technologies on innovation in both storage and generation;
and, finally, how the fossil-fuel price affects innovation. In the following, we discuss what
our theoretical analysis predicts for each of these relationships.
The first row of Table 1 shows the impact of better initial storage technologies on in-
novation.9 We find that innovation in storage, which improves the substitutability between
conventional and renewable electricity production, can promote innovation in the two gen-
eration technologies. Specifically, if conventional and renewable electricity (initially) are
substitutes (0As0 > 1), which recent empirical work suggests is most plausible,
10 then in-
novation in these technologies increases with the ability to store electricity. This happens
because improved storage technologies enhance the flexibility of the electricity market, and
a more flexible market increases the potential payoff from developing better generation tech-
nologies, both conventional and renewable. This implies that better storage technologies
promote innovation in both types of generation technologies, not just in renewables, by
mitigating the intermittency problem.
The second effect that we focus on is the impact of better electricity generation tech-
nologies on the incentives to innovate in storage. Innovation in storage is extensive when
renewable and conventional production are close to perfect complements and when they are
perfect substitutes (see Figure A.1(a)). Moreover, when conventional and renewable pro-
duction are not sufficiently close substitutes, better generation technologies lead to stronger
9Note that the initial level of the storage technology, As0, and the elasticity parameter, 0, have the same
impact on innovation. This is because the elasticity of substitution in the production stage is given by both
parameters. As the comparative statics for a change in 0 are the same as for As0, we only report the latter
in Table 1.
10See, for example, Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2004); Popp (2006a); Papageorgiou et al. (2016). Whereas
these and other studies estimate a constant elasticity of substitution, see Lazkano and Pham (2016) for the
estimate of a variable elasticity of substitution (VES).
11
incentives to innovate in storage. In contrast, as the two types of production become closer
substitutes, the marginal value of better storage technologies becomes lower (because of
higher substitution), and the incentives to innovate in storage become weaker. Thus, for a
sufficiently high initial elasticity of substitution, better generating technologies have a nega-
tive impact on innovation in storage. Finally, a higher initial elasticity of substitution leads
to a larger payoff from further innovation in electricity generation. This implies that, as the
storage technology (As0) improves, innovation efforts shift from storage toward generation.
This result suggests that innovation in storage and innovation in generation are substitutes
in this case (Figure A.1(a)).
Next, we consider the impact of better generation technologies on the equilibrium level
of innovation in conventional and renewable technologies. When renewable and conventional
production are substitutes, we find an ambiguous response in innovation to changes in the
initial efficiency of each electricity generation technology. Indeed, the impact of more knowl-
edge (higher efficiency) on current innovation depends on the size of the knowledge stock.11
As the initial generation technology improves, the marginal value of further innovation in the
technology falls, and eventually, the effect of more existing knowledge on innovation becomes
negative. In addition, as the knowledge stock in renewable generation expands, innovation
in conventional technologies shrinks and vice versa (see Figures A.1(c) and A.1(d)). The
reason is that innovation in a generation technology reduces its cost of production, which
makes the technology more competitive relative to the alternative technology, which then
attracts less innovation.
Finally, we study the effect of the fuel price on innovation. As the only difference be-
tween renewable and conventional production in our model is the fossil fuel input, the fuel
price affects conventional and renewable innovation in different ways. We find that the re-
sponse to higher fuel prices depends on the elasticity of substitution between renewable and
conventional production (see Table 1, last row, and Figure A.1(b)). When the two are com-
plements, firms innovate more in conventional technologies while reducing their innovation
in renewable generation and storage. In contrast, when renewable and conventional produc-
tion are substitutes, the innovation response to higher fuel prices depends on the level of the
fuel price. At a low fuel price, an increase in the price strengthens innovation in all three
technologies. However, at a higher fuel price, an increase in the price reduces innovation in
conventional technologies but boosts innovation in renewable generation and storage. Note,
11When renewable and conventional production are complements, more past innovation in renewable
(conventional) technologies yields more innovation in storage and conventional (renewable) technologies but
less innovation in renewable (conventional) technologies.
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however, that for sufficiently high fuel prices, innovation in storage falls in response to more
expensive fuel.12 These findings imply that energy taxes can induce innovation in electricity
storage technologies, provided that they do not drive up the post-tax fuel price too much
(see Figure A.1(b)).
To summarize, our theoretical analysis shows that the development of better electricity
storage solutions can potentially promote technological advancements in both renewable and
conventional electricity generation. As our theoretical predictions depend on the elasticity
of substitution between conventional and renewable production, we turn to empirical anal-
ysis to investigate further how different factors affect innovation in storage and generation
technologies.
First and foremost, our goal is to identify whether storage promotes innovation in re-
newable and conventional electricity generation. We investigate both the direct effect of
better storage solutions on innovation in generation and the effect of improved generation
technologies on innovation in storage and generation. In addition, we analyze the firm-level
innovation response to higher fuel prices. To accomplish this, we estimate a reduced form
of the equilibrium innovation level given by equations (10) and (11), using a global panel of
firm-level patent data. In the next section, we describe the data set, before presenting the
empirical strategy and analysis in sections 4 and 5.
3 Data
Estimating the reduced form of innovation equations (10) and (11) requires firm-level data
on research, past innovations, and energy prices. Our data set, which spans 49 years (1963–
2011) and 79 countries, comes primarily from two sources: the OECD’s patent database and
the International Energy Agency (IEA). We start by describing the selection of data before
presenting descriptive statistics.
We use patent data to measure research effort and to construct our unique patent data
set following Popp (2005) and Aghion et al. (2016). There are several advantages of using
12To understand the shift in firms’ responses for conventional and storage innovations, note that a higher
fuel price affects conventional electricity generation in two ways. On the one hand, it makes conventional
electricity more costly and, hence, less competitive relative to the renewable substitute, thereby reducing the
incentives to innovate in conventional technologies. On the other hand, a higher fossil fuel price increases
the gains from developing more efficient conventional generation technologies, thereby strengthening the
incentives to innovate. At low fuel prices, the latter effect on innovation is stronger, whereas at high fuel
prices, the first effect is stronger. This mechanism also affects innovation in storage because the more
expensive is the conventional electricity (high fuel price), the lower is its share in the grid mix, and the lower
is the gain from higher substitutability (better storage).
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patents as a measure of innovation. First, patents measure innovation output close to the
actual time of invention (Popp, 2005). In addition, each patent contains detailed information
about its applicants and inventors, which is helpful in identifying who owns each patent.
Following Aghion et al. (2016), we consider patent families from the OECD’s Triadic Patent
Database to account for the vast value differences in patents across firms and countries.13 A
Triadic patent application involves an applicant filing for an invention at each of the three
most important patent offices: the EPO, the USPTO, and the JPO. Triadic patents form
a special type of patent family that protect the same idea across different countries.14 This
implies that each patent application has an equivalent application at the EPO, the JPO, and
the USPTO. Because Triadic patents are filed in all three of the main patent offices, they
include only the highest valued patents. The Triadic patent families database provides a
common worldwide measure of innovation that avoids the heterogeneity of individual patent
office administrations (Popp, 2005).15
A disadvantage of Triadic patent families is the lag associated with the USPTO, with
legal delays between the priority date and the publication date varying from 18 months to
five years (Dernis and Khan, 2004). A patent shows up in the database, under its filing
date, only after it has been granted. As a consequence, US patent grants may delay the
completion of data on Triadic patent families.
At the time of filing, each patent is assigned one or more IPC codes, which describe
the technology area that a patent aims to protect.16 We use these IPC codes to identify
technologies related to electricity generation and storage.
For conventional electricity generation technologies, we use the patent classification list
13Patent families correct for home bias, which occurs because domestic firms tend to register more patents
than do international competitors. A direct implication of this bias is that patents filed domestically only
may have a lower value than patents registered both domestically and internationally. Also, because the same
invention registered in a different country will receive a different application number and may be classified
under additional International Patent Classification (IPC) codes, the risk of counting the same invention
more than once is high. We avoid such problems by using Triadic patents.
14A patent family consists of patents in multiple countries designed to protect one invention by the same
inventor. Furthermore, the OECD uses the concept of “extended families”, which are designed to identify
any possible links between patent documents (Martinez, 2010). This is advantageous because it provides
the most comprehensive method of consolidating patents into distinct families, allowing us to include an
extensive number of patented ideas and to minimize omissions.
15A disadvantage of Triadic patent families is the lag associated with the USPTO, with legal delays between
the priority date and the publication date varying from 18 months to five years (Dernis and Khan, 2004). A
patent shows up in the database, under its filing date, only after it has been granted. As a consequence, US
patent grants may delay the completion of data on Triadic patent families. In the last two years of our data
set, this delay is evident as the number of patents almost drops to zero (see Figure 1).
16Patent classification codes are developed by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and
provided by the IPO.
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compiled by Lanzi et al. (2011). In the appendix, Table B.3 presents IPC codes for efficiency-
improving fossil-fuel technologies, whereas Table B.4 lists general fossil-fuel based IPC codes.
For renewable electricity generation technologies, we compile the list of classification codes
directly from WIPO’s Green IPC Inventory (see Table B.5 in the appendix).17 This list
is more comprehensive than others previously used in the literature, and thus, our patent
database covers a significantly broader range of technologies. The most widely used list is
perhaps the one compiled by Johnstone et al. (2010), which contains a subset of the IPC codes
from WIPO’s Green Technology inventory. Although we employ WIPO’s complete list in our
baseline estimations, we evaluate the robustness of our results using the classification codes
by Johnstone et al. (2010). We present a comparison of these two classifications in Table
B.7 in the appendix. Finally, we select electricity storage technologies using WIPO’s Green
Technology inventory (Table B.6). In total, our baseline data set includes 392,445 patent
applications. Of these, 154,041 relate to conventional fossil-fuel technologies,18 178,841 are
for renewables, and 19,232 are for storage technologies.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of patent applications in the three technologies from 1963
to 2011. In the mid 1970s, we observe a sharp increase in electricity generation patenting.
The evolution of conventional and renewable patents is correlated, but a strong increase in
renewable patent applications occurred at the end of the 1990s, such that they surpassed
conventional patents, until the early 2000s, when a sharp decline occurred.19 The large drop
in patents at the end of the period is due to the aforementioned legal delays of patents
registered with the USPTO. This means that appearing in the Triadic patent database can
take up to five years from the time a patent is filed in all three patent offices.
Having defined and selected patents for all three types of technologies, we assign each
patent to its owner. As the Triadic database contains detailed information only for some ap-
plicants, we draw more comprehensive information from the OECD Harmonized Applicants
Names (HAN) database, which matches applicants with company names from business reg-
istry data. With this, we are able to link patents to firms and individuals. Fortunately, the
HAN database contains firm information for many patent applications in our sample. We
synchronize the remaining applications using applicant information contained in the Triadic
Patent Families database. This procedure allows us to match every patent with an applicant.
17The IPC codes listed in the IPC Green Inventory have been compiled by the IPC Committee of Experts
in concordance with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). For more
information, see http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/est/.
18Of these, 130,587 are general fossil-fuel technologies and 23,184 are efficiency-improving fossil-fuel tech-
nologies.
19This trend is consistent with Noailly and Smeets (2015) and Nesta et al. (2014).
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Figure 1: Global patenting over time.
However, it poses two difficulties.
First, applicant names in the Triadic Patent database contain a number of spelling, char-
acter, and name variations. For example, “3M Innovative Properties” and “3M Innovative
Properties Co” would be incorrectly treated as separate firms in the absence of name har-
monization. We harmonize firm names using algorithms and manual corrections to capture
variations in spelling and to match firms correctly with their patents. A second harmoniza-
tion challenge is that some patent applications have multiple inventors and applicants. In
these cases, we accurately represent the ownership of each patent by assigning the ownership
share of each patent to its corresponding firm.
Overall, our database contains 13,877 firms that claim residence in 79 countries. Of these
firms, 4.54% are devoted exclusively to the advancement of storage technologies, whereas
26.94% and 51.44% focus only on conventional and renewable innovation, respectively. In
addition, 11.27% of our sample firms innovate in both conventional and renewable electricity
generation, whereas only 2.21% innovate in all types of technologies. The share of firms that
innovate in renewable and storage technologies is 3.34%, while the share that innovates in
conventional and storage is 0.25%.20 Figure B.1 reports the number of firms per country, with
20Because there are more firms that innovate in renewable technologies than in conventional, our data do
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more detail provided in the appendix, whereas Table B.2 lists all countries. Most patenting
firms are based in a few countries, and the biggest countries in terms of innovating firms
are the US, Japan, Germany, France, and Great Britain. In addition to conducting a global
analysis using the full sample of 79 countries, we estimate our model using a subsample of
data on these five countries that account for the majority of innovating firms.
We combine the data into a firm-level panel containing the number of patent applications
for each technology type and year between 1963 and 2011. As Figure 1 shows, patenting
activity increases in the mid 1970s. For this reason, we use data from 1963 to 2011 to
calculate variables that explain past innovation, while we use data only for the period 1978-
2009 in the estimations. As only a small number of firms apply for patents every year, we
utilize an unbalanced panel to account for firms entering and exiting the market. We assume
that a firm is active, and therefore included in our unbalanced panel, from the first year that
it applies for a patent until the last year that it does so.21 For example, if a firm files for its
first patent in 1981 and its last patent in 1995, we assume that this firm is active at least
between 1981 and 1995.
Once we identify the number of patents that a firm applies for in each technology type in a
given year, we create two variables to describe the extent of their past innovations. Following
Aghion et al. (2016), we define a firm’s existing knowledge stock in terms of internal and
external past innovations. The internal knowledge stock captures a firm’s past innovations
in a specific technology, which we calculate by accumulating the total number of patents in
each technology type until year t. On the other hand, the external knowledge stock captures
spillover effects, which are represented by past innovations in a given technology by all other
firms in the relevant region. For each firm, we calculate this by adding the total number
of patents in a region by all the other companies in that region in year t. We classify a
firm’s external knowledge stocks (spillovers) into eleven geographical regions based on the
World Bank’s income classification. Our geographical regions are: Caucasian and Central
Asia, Eastern Asia, Eastern Europe, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern
America, Oceania, South Eastern Asia, Southern Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Western
Asia.22
Our theory predicts that energy prices affect innovation in the electricity sector. We
not suggest that there are more synergies between storage and renewable technologies, than between storage
and conventional technologies.
21We extend this period by including additional years at the beginning of the active period when considering
different lag structures in our estimations. We return to this issue when we present our empirical analysis
below.
22In our robustness analysis, we explore alternative definitions of spillover regions.
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include data on electricity input and output prices. We proxy input prices with coal, natural
gas, and oil prices, and we use electricity retail prices as proxies for the output price. We
draw country-level data from the IEA’s database of energy prices and taxes (IEA, 2014).
All prices are in US dollars per ton of oil equivalent net calorific value (USD/toe NCV).
Unfortunately, complete energy price series are only available for 33 out of the 79 countries
in our patent data set.23 Below, we explain how we address this issue.
Fuel and electricity prices in different countries behave similarly over time, even though
there are level differences. In addition, incomplete time series tend to have missing data at
the beginning and/or end of the series. Given this, we fill the gaps in the energy price series
by imposing the same annual growth over the missing range of the price series, as exhibited
by a relevant reference price index. This addresses the issue of level differences between
the reference price indices and the country-specific price series. In the case of non-OECD
countries for which we do not have any energy price data, we simply impose the most relevant
price index.
We choose the reference price for each country and energy type based on the characteris-
tics of the different energy markets. As there are global markets for oil and coal, we use the
respective global OECD price indices as reference prices. There is extensive international
trade in oil, and international trade in coal currently accounts for about 25% of the total coal
consumed (World Coal Association, 2015). Both oil and coal can travel large distances by
ship in relatively little time. However, because transportation costs account for a significant
share of the price of coal, international trade in this commodity generally occurs within two
main regional markets: the Atlantic market, driven by importing countries in Western Eu-
rope, and the Pacific market, driven by imports to China, Japan, and Korea. Nonetheless,
prices in these markets are closely related, justifying the use of a global price index.
Unlike oil and coal prices, our natural gas price data suggest some differences across
regions. Being more difficult to move than coal or oil, natural gas has traditionally been
more of a regional commodity, traded in three main markets: North America, Europe, and
Asia. For this reason, we use regional prices as reference prices for natural gas. For Europe,
we use the OECD Europe price index, whereas for Asia and the Middle East, we use the
23Note that the IEA data set contains both industry and household prices for the different commodities
and, in some cases, prices for use in electricity generation. In addition, the data set reports prices on different
types of coal and oil. As the different price series for each commodity are highly correlated, we select, for each
country, the price series with the lowest number of missing values. Given this, we impose the following order
of priority for uses: electricity generation, industry, and households. In addition, we impose the following
order of priority for types of oil: high sulfur, low sulfur, and light oil; and the following order of priority for
types of coal: steam coal and coking coal.
18
Japanese price series, as Japan is a key natural gas player in Asia. For the American
continent, we use the Mexican natural gas price as the reference, as Mexico is geographically
closer to the countries with missing data, and the Mexican price series is very similar to the
US and Canadian prices. Finally, because we have no natural gas prices for Africa, we use
the global OECD price index for gas in this region, which is our best measure of an average
world price.
Finally, our data set reveals relatively large differences in electricity prices across countries
and regions. Whereas fossil fuels used in electricity production can be shipped over large
distances, it is harder to sell electricity in markets (grids) other than the market in which
the electricity is produced. In addition, national and local regulations can have a big impact
on electricity prices. This makes it more challenging to identify the appropriate reference
price to fill in the missing data. For the American continent, where we lack information on
countries in Central and South America, we use the Mexican electricity price as a reference.24
For Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, we use the global OECD price index.25
As we rely on price indices to complete our energy price data set, it could be argued that
our approach reduces the variation in our data set. Note, however, that the largest countries
in terms of electricity-related patents are all part of the OECD, which means that we have
a complete or nearly complete set of energy price series for the most innovative countries.
Similarly, countries for which we make the strongest assumptions about energy prices (e.g.,
countries in Africa) are countries in which little patenting takes place. Therefore, we have
accurate energy prices for the vast majority of innovating firms in our data set and for all
firms in the five-country subsample.
Finally, we control for cross-country differences in the size of an economy and its wealth
by using real GDP and real GDP per capita, respectively. We draw these data from the
Penn World Tables (Feenstra et al., 2013).
Based on the patent data, we can identify the countries in which each firm in our data set
is active. Some companies are active in more than one country and are thus affected by the
regulations, taxes, and macroeconomic indicators of several countries. To account for this,
24We have complete price series for the US, Canada, Mexico, and Chile. We choose the Mexican price
because it is less volatile than the Chilean price and because, in terms of levels, it is located between the
Chilean and the North American prices. For Europe, we use the OECD Europe price index, as the price
differences among European countries are small.
25In Asia and the Middle East, electricity prices vary considerably across the relatively few countries for
which we have data. We choose a reference price based on the global OECD price index, which is close to
the average price over the countries for which we have data and does not exhibit extreme variation over
time, which could have affected our results. For Africa, we have no electricity prices and resort to using the
OECD (global) average as a best guess.
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we construct firm-specific variables for energy prices and economic indicators by calculating
the averages for these variables across all countries in which a firm is present. For firms
that are only active in one country, firm prices and economic variables are identical to the
respective country-level variables. Firm-level variation in energy prices and macroeconomic
indicators is useful, as it allows us to use country fixed effects to control for country-level
variation.26
As noted, altogether, the data set comprises 13,877 firms in 79 countries from 1963 to
2011. The data set accounts for the most valuable electricity-related patents, and these
patents capture the global trends in innovation in the electricity sector.
4 Empirical framework and identification
This section describes the econometric approach that we use to identify the role of electric-
ity storage for firm-level innovation in electricity generation technologies. Our estimation
strategy is based on the theoretical analysis in section 2 and, particularly, the firm-level
innovation in equilibrium (equations (10) and (11)). Following Aghion et al. (2016), we use
a fixed-effects Poisson estimator to estimate a reduced-form specification of the nonlinear
equation system given by equations (10) and (11). In particular, for firm i’s innovation in
technology j in year t, we estimate:
xj,it = exp (Aj,it−2 +αj ln Pit−1 + γj ln Zit−1) + δj,i + δj,n + δj,t + δj,nt +uj,it, j = s, c, r, (12)
where j denotes the type of technology (s storage, c conventional, and r renewable) and where
i, n, and t represent firm, country, and year. xj,it is the number of patents in technology j
that firm i applies for in year t. Aj,it is the firm’s existing knowledge stock, which we define
in terms of internal and external past innovations, following Aghion et al. (2016).
As our theoretical analysis predicts a nonlinear relationship between innovation and ex-
isting knowledge, we specify past innovation as:
Aj,it = β1jEmit + β2jIit + β3jI
2
it, (13)
where the external knowledge vector Emit represents for each technology, the total number
of patents across all firms minus firm i in firm i’s region m at time t, whereas the internal
26As each firm can be active in several countries, we can include both country and firm fixed effects.
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knowledge vector Iit is firm i’s stock of patents of the different technology types in year t.
27
Another main determinant of innovation is energy prices. Pit indicates a firm’s exposure
to energy prices in year t. We take into account the prices of both inputs and outputs in
the electricity sector. Our baseline specification uses the coal price as the proxy for input
prices in conventional electricity generation, and electricity prices as the proxy for output
prices. Our empirical model accounts for other factors that may affect innovation, including
the economic environment of the countries in which the firm is located. Specifically, Zit
is a vector that captures the firm-specific exposure to the economic environment, which
we characterize by the economy’s size (proxied by GDP) and wealth (proxied by GDP per
capita). As explained in section 3, we calculate Pit and Zit for each firm by taking the
average of all the energy prices and economic indicators across all countries in which firm i
is located. This captures multinational firms’ exposure to energy prices and macroeconomic
conditions in all countries in which they operate.
Our identification strategy, based on equation (12), attributes any differences in a firm’s
patent applications in a specific technology to be caused by differences in internal and exter-
nal knowledge stocks and energy prices, after controlling for macroeconomic, country, and
firm-specific time-varying heterogeneity.
To account for the possibility of firms entering and exiting the research sector, we only
include data for years in which firms are defined as active, as explained in section 3. We
control for time-varying, firm- and country-specific differences using a set of fixed effects.28
Specifically, δj,i, δj,n, and δj,t denote firm, country, and time fixed effects, whereas δj,nt
controls for the country–year fixed effect. As all country-level variables, including energy
prices and macroeconomic variables, are firm specific by construction, we include country
and time fixed effects to control for other unobserved variation. Finally, uj,it denotes the
error term.
As seen in Figure B.1, many countries in our sample host a small number of firms with
relatively few patents. This implies that there are too few observations to estimate the
full set of fixed effects (firm, country, year, and country-by-year) when using the full global
27Robustness analysis shows that squared terms of external knowledge stocks are not significant, and
therefore, we exclude them from the baseline specification.
28These fixed effects control for differences in electricity markets and innovation and energy policies across
countries, differences in firm sizes, industry focus, and many other characteristics. Both innovation efforts
and the number of patent applications may change over time in response to both the firms’ and the relevant
country’s idiosyncrasies, and the volatile nature of the industries. Finally, the country–year fixed effects
control for all time-varying country-specific factors, including environmental policies, innovation incentives,
or changes in the way that patents are granted.
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sample. We deal with this by estimating our main specification for a subsample of the
data that includes firms from the five most innovative countries. The subset of countries
with the highest number of innovations comprises the US, Japan, Germany, France, and
Great Britain. Therefore, we include firm, country, and year fixed effects in the full-sample
estimations, whereas the subsample estimations for the five-country subsample include a full
set of fixed effects.
We estimate the count data model in equation (12) using a fixed-effects Poisson esti-
mator, which assumes equality between the mean and the variance.29 Patent data often
presents a high degree of over-dispersion, for which the negative binomial distribution is
more appropriate. We investigate this issue by estimating our main specification assuming
both Poisson and negative binomial distributions. As our results show that over-dispersion is
not a problem in our data, we present the Poisson results as our baseline estimates. Finally,
to reflect adequately the delayed patenting response of firms to changes in innovation drivers,
and to reduce contemporaneous feedback effects, we lag the knowledge stock variables by
two periods and the rest of the explanatory variables by one period in our baseline model.30
Using the above econometric model, we empirically study the firm-level determinants
of innovation in the electricity sector and the role of electricity storage in innovation. We
discuss the main empirical results in the next section.
5 Empirical results
In this section, we present our main estimation results, followed by multiple robustness tests
to validate our results. We test three hypotheses: (1) How do better storage technologies
affect innovation in electricity generation? (2) How does innovation in electricity generation
affect innovation in storage? and (3) What is the impact of fossil-fuel prices on innova-
tion? To answer these questions, we estimate equation (12), which is a reduced form of the
innovation equilibrium that we derived in the theory section.
We present our baseline estimates in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 reports the marginal effects
of our Poisson estimates of the baseline specification, equation (12), using data from 1978 to
29Hausman et al. (1984) and Blundell et al. (1995, 2002) extensively study the challenges of estimating
dynamic count data models with patent data and propose a generalized Poisson estimator that includes fixed
effects, which allows for feedback effects from past innovation activity. In addition, our Poisson specification
has the advantage that, despite having relatively few annual observations per firm, the introduction of
firm-level fixed effects does not cause an incidental parameters problem (Cameron and Trivedi, 2013).
30As seen below, our robustness analysis shows that the lag specification does not significantly alter our
results.
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2009.31 Columns (1)–(3) use data from the full sample of 79 countries, controlling for firm
and year fixed effects, whereas columns (4)–(6) report the results for the five most innovative
countries and control for firm, year, and country fixed effects. As we have few observations
for many of the countries (recall Figure B.1), the full-sample estimations cannot converge to a
maximum likelihood if we include country fixed effects. Instead, we estimate the model with
the complete fixed-effects specification for the subsample of firms in the five most innovative
countries. Table 3 presents the results. Note that the fixed-effects specification in column
(2) of Table 3 is identical to that reported for the five-country sample in Table 2.
There are no statistically significant differences in key coefficients across the three fixed-
effects specifications reported in Table 3 for the five-country subsample. This suggests that
our full-sample estimates, which only control for firm and year fixed effects, are reliable.
Adding country fixed effects to the basic specification with only firm and year fixed effects
has little or no effect on the coefficient estimates and their standard errors. Adding year-by-
country fixed effects tend to increase the absolute value of the coefficient estimates slightly,
but it also increases the standard errors.
In the appendix, we present multiple robustness checks to validate our results. First, in
the baseline specification, conventional technologies include only efficiency-improving fossil-
fuel technologies. In Appendix C.1, we estimate our main specification using data on both
general and efficiency-improving fossil-fuel technologies. Second, the main estimates include
two-year lags on past innovations relative to the dependent variable, whereas prices and
macroeconomic indicators are lagged by one year. In Appendix C.2, we consider alternate lag
structures. Third, Appendix C.3 reports the results of using the definition of Johnstone et al.
(2010) instead of WIPO when selecting electricity patents. Next, Appendix C.4 estimates
the baseline specification including only the 20% most innovative firms, and Appendix C.5
considers alternative definitions of regions in which knowledge spillovers occur. Finally,
whereas the baseline specification uses coal prices as a proxy for fuel prices in conventional
production, Appendix C.6 reports the results from using natural gas and oil prices to measure
fuel prices. We also consider the potential endogeneity of coal and electricity prices in our
model, but we return to this and other potential caveats in section 5.5.
Overall, our robustness results show that the marginal effects reported in Tables 2 and
3 are highly robust to a variety of different specifications. We consistently find that past
innovation in electricity storage promotes innovation in both renewable and conventional
electricity generation technologies. This implies that storage is critical, not only to solve the
31We evaluate marginal effects at mean levels of the variables.
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intermittency problem of renewable electricity generation but also to increase the flexibility
of conventional generation. We discuss our baseline results in more detail below.
Table 2: Baseline estimates for all countries and top-five innovative countries (marginal
effects).
Dependent variable: firm-level patents
All countries Top five countries
Renewable Conventional Storage Renewable Conventional Storage
Internal knowledge (marginal effects):
L2.Storage .01108∗∗ .00661∗ -.0072∗ .01105∗∗ .00748∗ -.00631∗
(.00376) (.00312) (.00293) (.00401) (.00332) (.00265)
L2.Renewable -.00188∗ -.0002 .00182∗∗ -.0017∗ -.00023 .00172∗∗
(.00076) (.00176) (.00052) (.00078) (.00172) (.00056)
L2.Conventional -.00374 .0004 -.00038 -.00389 .00175 -.00012
(.00253) (.00216) (.00571) (.00265) (.00284) (.00563)
External knowledge:
L2.Storage .00023† -8.2e-05 .00026† .00013 -.00013 5.3e-05
(.00013) (.0002) (.00015) (.00015) (.00021) (.00016)
L2.Renewable -6.8e-05∗∗ -2.1e-05 -7.2e-05∗ -5.8e-05∗ -1.1e-05 -3.2e-05
(2.2e-05) (4.7e-05) (3.4e-05) (2.5e-05) (4.8e-05) (4.0e-05)
L2.Conventional -2.8e-05 -8.3e-05 8.9e-06 -6.5e-05 -1.3e-05 -7.7e-05
(5.4e-05) (1.0e-04) (9.0e-05) (6.2e-05) (.00013) (9.6e-05)
Energy prices (firm level):
L1.Coal -.3175∗ -.683∗∗ -.2066 -.4625∗ -.7042∗∗ -.4092
(.1359) (.2506) (.2321) (.1899) (.2343) (.3393)
L1.Electricity .1645 -.04924 .08163 .1903 .2113 .188
(.1937) (.2813) (.2431) (.2361) (.3411) (.3322)
Economic controls (firm level):
L1.GDP -.1408 -.318∗∗ .2058 -.2362∗ -.3057∗∗ .00381
(.08626) (.08135) (.1441) (.1033) (.1184) (.2124)
L1.GDPcap 1.276† .7467 .896 .4583 1.284 -.3656
(.68) (.6163) (.8632) (.7552) (1.112) (1.382)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year x Country FE No No No No No No
Number of observations 51245 13058 12059 40976 10490 10343
Significance levels: ∗∗: 1% ∗: 5% †: 10%
Note: The top five countries are the US, Japan, Germany, France, and Great Britain.
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Our theoretical results show that the level of substitutability between renewable and con-
ventional electricity is a key determinant in understanding the role of storage in innovation.
Table 4 compares the main empirical results with our theoretical predictions in section 2.3.
Most estimated effects are in line with the theoretical results for the case where renewable
and conventional production are substitutes. Combining the effects of internal and external
knowledge stocks on innovation in renewable, conventional, and storage, we find that with
one exception, all estimated effects, whether statistically significant or not, correspond with
the theoretical predictions when renewable and conventional production are substitutes. The
exception is the effect of the fuel price on innovation in renewable technologies, which con-
sistently and significantly, at the 5% level, violates our theoretical predictions across model
specifications. Indeed, the estimated effect of the fuel price on renewable innovation indi-
cates that conventional and renewable production are complements, not substitutes. We
nonetheless conclude that conventional and renewable electricity production are substitutes,
which is in line with the empirical literature that estimates the elasticity of substitution in
electricity generation (Popp, 2006a; Gerlagh and van der Zwaan, 2004; Papageorgiou et al.,
2016, among others). We further discuss the effect of the fuel price on innovation in section
5.3.
Table 4: Theoretical predictions compared with empirical results.
Innovation in Renewable Conventional Storage
Initial elasticity of subst., As00 Compl. Subs. Compl. Subs. Compl. Subs.
Initial storage technology, As0 − + − + − −
Initial renewable technology, Ac0 − +→ − + − + + → −
Initial conventional technology, Ad0 + − − + → − + +→ −
Fuel price, f − + + +→ − − +→ −
Note: Green (red) indicates that our empirical results support (violate) the theoretical predictions
of our model that conventional and renewable production are substitutes. Dark and light colors
denote significant and nonsignificant results at the 5% level, respectively.
5.1 How do better storage technologies affect innovation in
electricity generation?
To investigate the role of storage in electricity generation, we analyze the impact of internal
and external storage knowledge stocks on the firm-level probability of applying for a new
patent in electricity generation. In this case, we are interested in the coefficient estimates
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for the internal and external L2.Storage variables.32
As seen in the first rows of Tables 2 and 3, one additional internal storage patent increases
the firm-level probability of applying for a new patent in electricity generation. Specifically,
the coefficient estimate for the internal storage variable in the all countries, 0.0111, is sta-
tistically significant at the 1% level (renewable column of Table 2). The estimate indicates
that if the average firm had an additional storage patent two years ago, the probability that
the firm files for a renewable patent today increases with 1.11%. We obtain exactly the same
point estimate if we instead use data on the five most innovative countries. This positive
effect of storage on innovation in renewables is expected, as storing electricity is considered
to be the key to mitigating the intermittency problem of renewable electricity generation.
Similarly, the coefficient estimate for the internal storage knowledge stock variable in the
all countries, 0.0066, is statistically significant at the 5% level, and indicates that having one
more storage patent increases the probability that the average firm applies for a conventional
patent by 0.66% (conventional column of Table 2). The corresponding marginal effect of an
additional storage patent for the five-country sample is 0.75%, also statistically significant
at the 5% level. Hence, our results suggest that more internal storage knowledge increases
innovation in both renewable and conventional technologies. The positive impact of stor-
age technologies on conventional technologies is perhaps less obvious at first but even more
striking. In addition, Table C.1 in the appendix shows that more past innovation in storage
no longer has a statistically significant effect on innovation in conventional technologies if
we include both general fossil-fuel technologies and efficiency-improving technologies. This
suggests that better storage solutions primarily benefit efficiency-improving technologies and
that more innovation in storage can steer innovation in conventional generation toward im-
proved efficiency. One reason for this is that electricity storage allows thermal power plants
to reduce their ramping costs, which enhances the importance of efficiency in production.
Having looked at the effects of internal knowledge in storage technologies, we consider
the external knowledge (spillover) effects. We find that more external storage knowledge
has a positive effect on innovation in renewable generation. This finding is statistically
significant at the 10% level for the full sample but is not significant for the five-country
subsample, regardless of the fixed-effects specification.33 The corresponding estimates for
32Note that L2 refers to the number of lags of the variable, which in the case of knowledge stocks is two.
33The small standard errors on the coefficient estimates for the external knowledge stocks in our estimation
tables could be caused by multicolinearity. Since 82.94% of firms exclusively patent in one technology type,
this is likely the result of the large number of firms that in any given year do not file for any patents in the
other two technologies.
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conventional generation are negative but not significant. Our baseline estimation includes
eleven regions for knowledge spillovers, based on the World Bank’s income classification.
Appendix C.5 reports three alternative definitions of regions that define spillovers occurring:
(i) at the country level (Table C.6); (ii) within five world regions, as defined by the Fe´de´ration
International de Football Association (FIFA), (Table C.7);34 and (iii) at the global level, so
that all countries are subject to the same knowledge spillovers (Table C.8). Alternative
definitions of spillover regions do not qualitatively change the results regarding how external
knowledge in storage affects innovation in generating technologies.35
To conclude, our empirical results show that the development of storage technologies pro-
motes innovation in both renewable and efficiency-improving fossil fuel technologies. These
results are in line with our theoretical predictions, as summarized in Table 4, and they are
robust to a variety of different specifications, including alternative lag structures and firm
sizes (refer to Appendix C.2 and C.4). These results imply that innovation efforts directed
at the development of better storage technologies can give renewable electricity a boost by
mitigating the intermittency problem. However, whether in fact storage will increase the
share of renewable electricity depends on its competitiveness in comparison with more effi-
cient conventional electricity production, which gains from efficiency-improving innovations
and lower ramping costs with storage.
5.2 How does innovation in electricity generation affect techno-
logical advancements in storage?
Next, we analyze the feedback effect of better electricity generation technologies on inno-
vation in storage. Tables 2 and 3 show that having an additional renewable energy patent
promotes new innovation in storage technologies, although it may have a negative effect on
innovation in storage in other firms in the region (negative spillovers). This result holds for
the full sample and across the different fixed-effects specifications for the five-country sam-
ple. However, the coefficient capturing the external effect becomes smaller, and its standard
error increases, as we control for more fixed effects. Therefore, we conclude that a greater
level of innovation in the past in renewable generation has a positive effect on innovation in
storage overall.
34The five FIFA regions are Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and
North America.
35Estimating the baseline model without R&D spillovers also yields estimates that are consistent with our
baseline results.
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Although we find a positive feedback effect between innovation in storage and innova-
tion in renewable generation, we find no evidence for such feedback between innovation in
storage and innovation in conventional generation. On the contrary, more past innovation in
efficiency-improving conventional generation has a negative but insignificant effect on inno-
vation in storage, both within the firm and externally (spillover effects). The effects of both
internal and external generation knowledge stocks on storage are robust to all four definitions
of regions for knowledge spillovers (see Appendix C.5), and a variety of other specifications,
as presented in the robustness analysis in the appendix.
Finally, an additional storage patent lowers a firm’s probability of filing for another
storage patent. This result is in line with our theoretical analysis, and it is consistent across
a number of different specifications and subsamples (see, for example, Tables 2 and 3, and
Appendices C.2 and C.4). However, the results are largely insignificant for the effect of
external storage knowledge stocks on innovation in storage.
To summarize, we find the existence of a positive feedback effect between innovation
in renewable generation and storage technologies, but our results suggest no such feedback
effect between conventional technologies and storage. This implies that more past innovation
in renewable technologies stimulates innovation in storage technologies and vice versa. Thus,
policy efforts directed toward renewable technologies can indirectly promote the advancement
of storage technologies, which in turn further promote innovation in renewable technologies.
5.3 How does the fossil-fuel price affect innovation?
Our final objective is to analyze the impact of fossil-fuel prices on innovation in the elec-
tricity sector and, particularly, their impact on the direction of innovation (renewable versus
conventional). As our baseline specification uses coal prices as a proxy for the fuel price, we
focus on the effect of the coal price.36 Many economists argue in favor of taxing carbon emis-
sions to make fossil fuels more expensive and, thus, to induce a shift from carbon-emitting
fossil fuels to cleaner renewable energy sources. This motivates our analysis of how the fuel
price affects innovation.
Our results show that a higher coal price reduces innovation in electricity generation
and in storage. The negative effects of the coal price on innovation in conventional and
storage technologies are in line with our theoretical predictions, given that renewable and
conventional electricity production are substitutes (cf. Table 4). The finding that the coal
price is a determinant of innovation in conventional electricity generation is also consistent
36In section 5.5, we consider the alternative fuel prices natural gas and oil.
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with the results of Popp (2002). However, the negative impact of the coal price on innovation
in renewable technologies does not fit with our theoretical predictions unless renewable and
conventional production are complements.
To understand this result better, consider the following. Whereas our theoretical analysis
includes two electricity inputs, intermittent renewable electricity and nonrenewable electric-
ity, the empirical analysis contains a number of different renewable and nonrenewable energy
sources. Some of these are better suited to providing base-load power, whereas others are
better suited to providing peak-load power. Power plants that provide base-load electricity
run 24 hours a day, whereas peak-load plants run only when demand is high. Furthermore,
base-load electricity is usually relatively cheap, but these plants are inflexible, as they need
a long time to adjust production. In contrast, peak plants are turned on and off frequently,
which makes them costly to run, and they require periods of downtime. Among the non-
renewable electricity sources, we have a full suite of both peak-load and base-load options
for electricity production. For example, thermal coal-fired power plants might provide base-
load power, whereas natural-gas-fired peaker plants provide peak-load power. Intermittent
renewable energy sources can also provide both base-load and peak-load power, but to en-
sure reliability of supply in the absence of efficient electricity storage solutions, these energy
sources must be combined with nonrenewable electricity to ensure sufficient base-load and
peak-load electricity production.37
Our theoretical analysis in section 2.3 shows that the role of the fuel price depends on
the substitutability between electricity from intermittent renewable sources and from stable
nonrenewable sources. Indeed, the different types of both renewable and conventional pro-
duction facilities can be substitutes for, or complements to, each other. In general, peak-load
plants complement base-load plants. Hence, a natural gas peaker plant complements a coal-
fired thermal power plant, but it might also complement intermittent renewable production.
Therefore, depending on the efficiency of the electricity storage solution, we might find that
for renewable electricity production, conventional electricity is a complement that acts as a
buffer, whereas for conventional production as a whole, renewable electricity production is a
substitute.
This brings us back to the seemingly odd result that the fossil fuel price has a negative
impact on innovation in renewable electricity generation, which implies that renewable and
conventional electricity are complements. In light of the above discussion, this might imply
37Alternatively, one could supply only renewable electricity, but this would require large investments in
renewable electricity generation capacity to ensure sufficient production at all times to balance the grid on
and off peak. However, this will change as better solutions for storing electricity become available.
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that conventional production is a complement for renewable production, as suggested by the
negative impact of the fuel price on renewable innovation, whereas for the complete suite of
conventional production alternatives, renewable electricity is a substitute. Thus, until more
efficient large-scale storage solutions become available, a higher fuel price hurts innovation
in both conventional and renewable generation.
To conclude, we find that a higher fossil fuel price shrinks innovation not only in conven-
tional technologies but also in renewable technologies. Indeed, the results from the richer
fixed-effects specification (column (2) of Table 3) suggests that a higher fuel price reduces
innovation in renewable technologies more than it reduces innovation in conventional tech-
nologies. Given the positive feedback effect between innovation in renewable and storage
technologies, less innovation in renewable technologies resulting from a higher fuel price in-
directly discourages innovation in storage, which in turn affects renewable innovation. Hence,
until more efficient electricity storage solutions exist, taxing fossil fuels is unlikely to boost
innovation in renewable and storage technologies, unless one combines such a policy with
other instruments that stimulate innovation in these technologies.
5.4 Other determinants
In addition to past innovation and fuel prices, we control for country size (proxied by GDP)
and wealth (proxied by GDP per capita). Our results show that the size of a country has
a negative impact on the probability of applying for a conventional electricity generation
patent, whereas the wealth of a country promotes innovation in renewable technologies.
These effects are robust to different model specifications using the full global sample. When
we focus on the most innovative countries, the size of a country discourages innovation in
conventional electricity generation, whereas wealth does not have a statistically significant
effect on innovation (Table 3). We do not find this surprising as the most innovative countries
are large and wealthy economies, which exhibit less variation in GDP and GDP per capita
than does the full data set.
5.5 Caveats
To complete our empirical analysis, we discuss potential caveats associated with our analysis.
Specifically, we investigate the choice of estimator, the need to control for a firm’s presample
innovation history, our subsample selection of the most innovative countries and firms, and
adequate lag structures. We start by considering the choice of estimator.
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As only a small number of firms apply for patents every year, we define an unbalanced
panel to account for firms entering and exiting the industry over time, as described in section
3. Our baseline estimation with this unbalanced panel uses a generalized Poisson estimator
with fixed effects. However, one might argue that our sample portrays the average firm
as being more innovative than is the case because we only define firms as active once they
apply for a patent. To consider the implications of this, we estimate our baseline specification
using a fully balanced panel, which implicitly assumes that all firms are active over the full
period (1978–2009). As the data exhibit over-dispersion, with a variance 141 times larger
than the mean, we use a negative binomial estimator in this case. Such a model starts from
a Poisson regression model and adds multiplicative random effects to represent unobserved
heterogeneity (Greene, 1994). Table C.13 shows that our main results are robust to this
specification, and therefore, we are confident that our definition of active firms does not
significantly affect our results.
In contrast to other studies, we do not control for presample history in our baseline
estimation, which is the standard way to capture unobserved heterogeneity across firms at
the beginning of the sample period (Blundell et al., 1995). We exclude presample history
because, by construction, our unbalanced panel contains only active firms. In addition,
the presample period (1963–1978) contains only a few companies, several of which became
inactive after a few years. Therefore, unobserved heterogeneity caused by firms’ presample
history does not represent an issue in our sample. Table C.15 reports the estimation results
when we control for each firm’s presample innovation history by introducing the average
number of registered patents per firm between 1963 and 1978, and an indicator variable
taking a value of one if the firm did not register any patent prior to 1978. The results from
estimating the baseline model with presample controls and all data on firms in all years
confirm that controlling for presample history does not significantly alter our main results.
Another potential issue is the low number of firms and patents for many countries (Figure
B.1). To deal with this, we have estimated our model with a complete set of fixed effects
for a five-country subsample. We extend the subsample to include the 12 most innovative
countries (Table C.14). Our main results are robust to this modification, implying that the
implications of our results extend beyond the five most innovative countries. The same is
true if we consider the top 10 or 15 countries.38
A related issue is the importance of firm size. Our sample totals 13,877 firms, with a
38Note that we do not report the results for the top 10 and top 15 subsamples, as they are similar to the
other results. However, these results are available from the authors upon request.
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large heterogeneity in the number of patents per firm. One might argue that firms with more
patents behave differently from other firms, and to address this, we estimate our baseline
model for a subsample containing only the top 15% most innovative firms (Table C.4). To
be included in the top 15% most innovative firms, firms must have filed more than 15 patent
applications. Together, these firms own 78% of all patents in our sample. We consider other
cutoff values for what constitutes a large firm, but because our results are robust to different
cutoff levels, we present only the results for the top 15%.39 The results for this subsample
are consistent with our main results, suggesting that the largest firms are representative of
the full sample.
Our baseline results show that an increase in the coal price reduces innovation in both
generation and storage. However, our robustness analysis shows that other fossil-fuel prices,
natural gas and oil prices, do not have the same impact on innovation (see Tables C.9 and
C.10). This is not surprising as coal is used primarily in base-load production, whereas
natural gas is the dominant fuel in peak-load production, and oil often is considered to be
a mid-load fuel. We find that the natural gas price does not have a statistically significant
impact on innovation in the electricity sector, but the coefficients indicate a positive effect
on innovation in efficiency-improving conventional technologies and a negative effect on in-
novation in renewables and storage technologies. The estimated coefficients for how the oil
price affects innovation are generally insignificant, but at the 5% statistical significance level,
we find that a higher oil price promotes innovation in renewable technologies (full sample).
However, regardless of which fuel we use to proxy the fuel price, our results are consistent
in terms of how storage affects innovation in the sector.
A related issue is the potential endogeneity of energy prices in our estimations. Our
baseline specification includes electricity input and output prices, both of which might be
affected by innovation in the industry. To investigate this potential endogeneity issue further,
we exclude the electricity price from our specification and reestimate the model. Table C.11
shows that our baseline specification is robust to this. Another way to deal with the potential
endogeneity issue is by lagging potentially endogenous variables, which we turn to next.
Finally, we look into issues related to the lag structure. Our baseline estimates include
a two-year lag for the internal and external knowledge stocks, whereas energy prices and
macroeconomic indicators are lagged one year. In Appendix C.2, we consider one- and three-
year lags for internal and external knowledge stocks. The results show that the coefficient
39Whereas the firms with more than 15 patents each account for 15% of firms and 78% of total patents in
our sample, firms with more than 20 patents account for 11.7% of firms and 73% of patents.
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estimates become slightly more precise as we increase the number of lags, suggesting that it
might take a few years after filing a patent for the effect of the new knowledge to materialize
in new patents filed (Tables C.2 and C.3). Other than this, the lag structure does not
significantly affect our main results.
Overall, these exercises show that our main results are robust to a number of different
model specifications and assumptions.
6 Conclusion
There are many calls for more renewable electricity to reduce carbon emissions, but over-
coming the intermittency problem is critical for the expansion of renewable electricity. Both
policy makers and scientists point to large-scale electricity storage as the remedy for this
problem. In this study, we investigate the role of storage in electricity generation. Whereas
past economic research on storage focuses on the benefits for renewable technologies, our
paper analyzes the role of electricity storage for the entire electricity sector. Building on
a directed technological change framework, we model innovation in electricity storage as a
process that improves the ease of substitution between renewable and conventional electricity
production. This model predicts that better electricity storage solutions promote technolog-
ical advancements in both renewable and conventional electricity generation when the two
are substitutes. Using global firm-level patent data from 1963 to 2011, we present empirical
evidence that better storage technologies positively affect innovation in both renewable and
efficiency-improving conventional electricity generation.
Our study makes three main contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the
theoretical literature on induced innovation and the environment by proposing a mechanism
that endogenizes the elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty inputs in the directed
technological change framework. Second, we contribute to the empirical literature on green
innovation in the electricity sector, by providing new empirical evidence on the role of elec-
tricity storage. Finally, we contribute to the literature on energy prices and innovation by
offering new insights about the relationship between fossil fuel prices and innovation in the
electricity generation sector.
Our results provide several policy implications. First, our results add nuance to the
policy debate on curbing carbon emissions. We find that the development of large-scale
storage solutions promote innovation not only in renewable technologies but also in efficiency-
improving conventional technologies. In addition, we find evidence for a positive feedback
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effect between innovation in renewables and in storage, whereas we find no such relationship
between innovation in conventional generation and storage. Therefore, whether storage
will curb carbon emissions from the electricity sector depends on two main factors: the
competitiveness of renewable energy against conventional electricity generation, and the
conventional generation mix when storage increases the efficiency of fossil-fuel technologies
and reduces the role of ramping costs. This implies that policy makers cannot rely on
electricity storage alone to boost the use of renewable energy or to reduce carbon emissions.
Second, our results bring new insights into the debate on carbon pricing in the electricity
sector. Contrary to what we initially expected, our empirical results show that a higher input
price for fuel (coal) not only discourages innovation in conventional technologies but also
reduces innovation in renewable technologies. A plausible explanation for the negative impact
on renewables is that without large-scale electricity storage, intermittent renewable electricity
relies on conventional electricity as a buffer to ensure grid balance. This suggests that until
more efficient storage solutions are available, conventional electricity is a complement for
intermittent renewable electricity. In the light of this, the negative impact of the fuel price
on innovation in renewables is less surprising. Until better storage solutions are available,
policy makers should consider accompanying policy measures when using the fuel price as
an instrument to steer innovation toward renewable technologies.
Finally, although our results may be somewhat discouraging in terms of the role of storage
in reducing carbon emissions, our empirical results offer more encouraging insights for the
efficiency of the electricity sector. We find that better storage solutions can foster efficiency
in both conventional and renewable electricity generation. This enables electricity system
operators to combine renewable and conventional electricity more efficiently as they face
rising pressure to meet an increasing and volatile electricity demand, in addition to stringent
environmental regulations. Thus, electricity storage can enhance energy security and reduce
blackouts by increasing the flexibility of electricity markets.
To conclude, better storage technologies can solve the main drawback of renewable elec-
tricity, the intermittency problem. In addition, our study shows that the development of
better electricity storage solutions is beneficial beyond the arena of renewable technologies,
as it improves the efficiency of the entire electricity sector. In addition, electricity storage
has the potential to reduce emissions from the electricity sector, provided that the necessary
policy measures are taken to ensure that renewables remain competitive in a more efficient
electricity market.
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Appendix
A Comparative statics
(1)
(2)
 b d 0.5 :
 beta1 d 0.5 :
 phiC d 1 : phiD d 1 :
 psiS d 0.25 : psiC d 0.25 : psiD d 0.25 :
out d nsol 1, e0, ac, ad, b, beta1, phiC, phiD, psiS, psiC, psiD ;
p = 2.103382502, xc = 0.9654053392, xd = 0.8999821324, z = 0.4754169737
XCstar d F, E0, Ac, Ad, B /subs nsol F, E0, Ac, Ad, B, beta1, phiC, phiD, psiS, psiC, psiD , xc ;
XDstar d F, E0, Ac, Ad, B /subs nsol F, E0, Ac, Ad, B, beta1, phiC, phiD, psiS, psiC, psiD , xd ;
Zstar d F, E0, Ac, Ad, B /subs nsol F, E0, Ac, Ad, B, beta1, phiC, phiD, psiS, psiC, psiD , z ; 
F, E0, Ac, Ad, B /subs nsol F, E0, Ac, Ad, B, β1, phiC, phiD, psiS, psiC, psiD , xc
F, E0, Ac, Ad, B /subs nsol F, E0, Ac, Ad, B, β1, phiC, phiD, psiS, psiC, psiD , xd
F, E0, Ac, Ad, B /subs nsol F, E0, Ac, Ad, B, β1, phiC, phiD, psiS, psiC, psiD , z
EFFECT OF ELASTICITY PARAMETERS:
plot 'XCstar f, ee0, ac, ad, b ', 'XDstar f, ee0, ac, ad, b ', 'Zstar f, ee0, ac, ad, b ' , ee0 = 0.5 ..4,
 labels = Elasticity parameter e 0 , xj- , legend = "clean", "dirty", "storage" ;  
UHQHZ FRQY storage
Elasticity parameter, e
 0
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*
0
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1.5
plot 'XCstar f, e0, ac, ad, bb ', 'XDstar f, e0, ac, ad, bb ', 'Zstar f, e0, ac, ad, bb ' , bb = 0.25 ..2,
(a) Storage technologies (represented by 0)
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 Fuel price, f
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(b) Fuel price (for 0 > 1)
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Figure A.1: Effect of electricity storage, past innovations, and fossil fuel price on the equi-
librium level of innovation when renewable and conventional technologies are
substitutes (panels b-d). Note: We use the following parameter values to generate
the figure: β = 0.5, 0 = 0.8, As0 = 0.5, Ac0 = 1, Ar0 = 0.75, f = 1.1, φc = φr = 1,
ψs = ψc = ψr = 0.25.
39
B Data construction
Table B.1: Variables and sources of data.
Variable Unit of measure Source
Patents Number of patent applications OECD Triadic Patent Fam-
ilies Database
Firm characteristics OECD REGPAT Database
Firm characteristics OECD HAN database
Energy prices including taxes Constant 2005 national prices
(in millions of 2005 U.S. $ )
IEA Energy Prices & Taxes
Real GDP Constant 2005 national prices
(in millions of 2005 U.S. $ )
Penn World Table
Population Millions of people Penn World Table
Table B.2: List of countries.
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bermuda,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Cayman Islands, Chile, China, Colombia,
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Finland, France, Georgia,
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Is-
rael, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mau-
ritius, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slove-
nia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Great Britain, United States of America.
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B.1 International patent classifications (IPC)
Table B.3: Patent classes for efficiency-improving electricity generation technologies.
IPC code Description
Coal gasification
C10J3 Production of combustible gases containing carbon monoxide from solid carbona-
ceous fuels
Improved burners [Classes listed below excluding combinations with B60,B68,F24,F27]
F23C1 Combustion apparatus specially adapted for combustion of two or more kinds of
fuel simultaneously or alternately,at least one kind of fuel being fluent
F23C5/24 Combustion apparatus characterised by the arrangement or mounting of burners;
disposition of burners to obtain a loop flame
F23C6 Combustion apparatus characterised by the combination of two or more combus-
tion chambers
F23B10 Combustion apparatus characterised by the combination of two or more combus-
tion chambers
F23B30 Combustion apparatus with driven means for agitating the burning fuel; com-
bustion apparatus with driven means for advancing the burning fuel through the
combustion chamber
F23B70 Combustion apparatus characterised by means for returning solid combustion
residues to the combustion chamber
F23B80 Combustion apparatus characterised by means creating a distinct flow path for
fluegases or for non-combusted gases given off by the fuel
F23D1 Burners for combustion of pulverulent fuel
F23D7 Burners in which drops of liquid fuel impinge on a surface
F23D17 Burners for combustion simultaneously or alternatively of gaseous or liquid or
pulverulent fuel
Fluidised bed combustion
B01J8/20-22 Chemical or physical processes in general, conducted in the presence of fluids and
solid particles; apparatus for such processes; with liquid as a fluidising medium
B01J8/24-30 Chemical or physical processes in general, conducted in the presence of fluids
and solid particles; apparatus for such processes; according to “fluidised-bed”
technique
F27B15 Fluidised bed furnaces; Other furnaces using or treating finely divided materials
in dispersion
F23C10 Apparatus in which combustion takes place in afluidised bed of fuel or other
particles
Improved boilers for steam generation
F22B31 Modifications of boiler construction, or of tube systems, dependent on installation
of combustion apparatus; Arrangements or dispositions of combustion apparatus
F22B33/14-16 Steam generation plants,e.g.comprising steam boilers of different types in mutual
association; combinations of low-and high-pressure boilers
Improved steam engines
F01K3 Plants characterised by the use of steam or heat accumulators, or intermediate
steam heaters, therein
F01K5 Plants characterised by use of means for storing steam in an alkali to increases
team pressure,e.g. of Honigmann or Koenemann type
F01K23 Plants characterised by more than one engine delivering power external to the
plant, the engines being driven by different fluids
Super-heaters
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Table B.3 – continued from previous page
IPC code Description
F22G Steam super heating characterised by heating method
Improved gas turbines
F02C7/08-105 Features, component parts, details or accessories; heating air supply before com-
bustion,e.g. by exhaust gases
F02C7/12-143 Features, component parts, details or accessories; cooling of plants
F02C7/30 Features, component parts, details or accessories; preventing corrosion in gas-
swept spaces
Combined cycles
F01K23/02-10 Plants characterised by more than one engine delivering power external to the
plant, the engines being driven by different fluids; the engine cycles being ther-
mally coupled
F02C3/20-36 Gas turbine plants characterised by the use of combustion products as the working
fluid; using special fuel, oxidant or dilution fluid to generate the combustion
products
F02C6/10-12 Plural gas-turbine plants; combinations of gas-turbine plants with other appa-
ratus; supplying working fluid to a user,e.g. a chemical process, which returns
working fluid to a turbine of the plant
Improved compressed-ignitionengines
[Classes listed below excluding combinations with B60,B68,F24,F27]
F02B1/12-14 Engines characterised by fuel-air mixture compression; with compression ignition
F02B3/06-10 Engines characterised by fuel-air mixture compression; with compression ignition
F02B7 Engines characterised by the fuel-air charge being ignited by compression ignition
of an additional fuel
F02B11 Engines characterised by both fuel-air mixture compression and air compression,
or characterised by both positive ignition and compression ignition,e.g.indifferent
cylinders
F02B13/02-04 Engines characterised by the introduction of liquid fuel into cylinders by use of
auxiliary fluid; compression ignition engines using air or gas for blowing fuel into
compressed air in cylinder
F02B49 Methods of operating air- compressing compression-ignition engines involving in-
troduction of small quantities of fuel in the form of a fine mist into the air in the
engine’s intake
Co-generation
F01K17/06 Use of steam or condensate extracted or exhausted from steam engine plant;
returning energy of steam, in exchanged form,to process,e.g. use of exhaust steam
for drying solid fuel of plant
F01K27 Plants for converting heat or fluid energy into mechanical energy
F02C6/18 Plural gas-turbine plants; combinations of gas-turbine plants with other appara-
tus; using the waste heat of gas-turbine plants outside the plants themselves, e.g.
gas-turbine power heat plants
F02G5 Profiting from waste heat of combustion engines
F25B27/02 Machines, plant, or systems, using particular sources of energy; using waste heat,
e.g. from internal-combustion engines
Source: Lanzi et al. (2011).
42
Table B.4: Patent classes for general fossil fuel technologies.
IPC code Description
C10J Production of fuel gases by carburetting air or other gases without pyrolysis
F01K Steam engine plants; steam accumulators; engine plants not otherwise provided for;
engines using special working fluids or cycles
F02C Gas-turbine plants; air intakes for jet-propulsion plants; controlling fuel supply in air-
breathing jet-propulsion plants
F02G Hot-gas or combustion-product positive-displacement engine; use of waste heat of com-
bustion engines,not otherwise provided for
F22 Steam generation
F23 Combustion apparatus; combustion processes
F27 Furnaces; kilns; ovens; retorts
Source: Lanzi et al. (2011).
Table B.5: Patent classes for renewable electricity generation technologies.
IPC code Description
H01M 4/86-4/98, 8/00-
8/24, 12/00-12/08
Fuel cells
H01M 4/86-4/98 Electrodes
H01M 4/86-4/98 Inert electrodes with catalytic activity
H01M 2/00-2/04 , 8/00-
8/24
Non-active parts
H01M 12/00-12/08 Within hybrid cells
C10B 53/00, C10J Pyrolysis or gasification of biomass
Harnessing energy from manmade waste
C10L 5/00 Agricultural waste
C10L 5/42, 5/44 Fuel from animal waste and crop residues
F23G 7/00, 7/10 Incinerators for field, garden or wood waste
C10J 3/02, 3/46, F23B
90/00, F23G 5/027
Gasification
B09B 3/00, F23G 7/00 Chemical waste
C10L 5/48, F23G 5/00,
F23G 7/00
Industrial waste
C21B 5/06 Using top gas in blast furnaces to power pigiron production
D21C 11/00 Pulp liquors
A62D 3/02, C02F 11/04,
11/14
Anaerobic digestion of industrial waste
F23G 7/00, 7/10 Industrial wood waste
B09B 3/00, F23G 5/00 Hospital waste
B09B Landfill gas
B01D 53/02, 53/04,
53/047, 53/14, 53/22,
53/24, C10L 5/46
Separation of components
F23G 5/00 Municipal waste
Hydro energy
E02B 9/00-9/06 Water-power plants
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Table B.5 – continued from previous page
IPC code Description
E02B 9/08 Tide or wave power plants
F03B, F03C Machines or engines for liquids
F03B 13/12-13/26 Using wave or tide energy
F03B 15/00-15/22 Regulating, controlling or safety means of machines or engines
B63H 19/02, 19/04 Propulsion of marine vessels using energy derived from water movement
F03G 7/05 Ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC)
F03D Wind energy
H02K 7/18 Structural association of electric generator with mechanical driving motor
B63B 35/00, E04H 12/00,
F03D 11/04
Structural aspects of wind turbines
B60K 16/00 Propulsion of vehicles using wind power
B60L 8/00 Electric propulsion of vehicles using wind power
B63H 13/00 Propulsion of marine vessels by wind-powered motors
Solar energy
H01L 27/142, 31/00
31/078, H01G 9/20, H02N
6
Devices adapted for the conversion of radiation energy into electrical energy
H01L 27/30, 51/42-51/48 Using organic materials as the active part
H01L 25/00, 25/03, 25/16,
25/18, 31/042
Assemblies of a plurality of solar cells
C01B 33/02, C23C 14/14,
16/24, C30B 29/06
Silicon; single-crystal growth
G05F 1/67 Regulating to the maximum power available from solar cells
F21L 4/00, F21S 9/03 Electric lighting devices with, or rechargeable with, solar cells
H02J 7/35 Charging batteries
H01G 9/20, H01M 14/00 Dye-sensitised solar cells (DSSC)
F24J 2/00-2/54 Use of solar heat
F24D 17/00 For domestic hot water systems
F24D 3/00, 5/00, 11/00,
19/00
For space heating
F24J 2/42 For swimming pools
F03D 1/04, 9/00, 11/04,
F03G 6/00
Solar updraft towers
C02F 1/14 For treatment of water, waste water or sludge
F02C 1/05 Gas turbine power plants using solar heat source
H01L 31/058 Hybrid solar thermal-PV systems
B60K 16/00 Propulsion of vehicles using solar power
B60L 8/00 Electric propulsion of vehicles using solar power
F03G 6/00-6/06 Producing mechanical power from solar energy
E04D 13/00, 13/18 Roof covering aspects of energy collecting devices
F22B 1/00, F24J 1/00 Steam generation using solar heat
F25B 27/00 Refrigeration or heat pump systems using solar energy
F26B 3/00, 3/28 Use of solar energy for drying materials or objects
F24J 2/06, G02B 7/183 Solar concentrators
F24J 2/04 Solar ponds
Geothermal energy
F01K, F24F 5/00, F24J
3/08, H02N 10/00, F25B
30/06
Use of geothermal heat
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Table B.5 – continued from previous page
IPC code Description
F03G 4/00-4/06, 7/04 Production of mechanical power from geothermal energy
F24J 1/00, 3/00, 3/06 Other production or use of heat, not derived from combustion, e.g. natural heat
F24D 11/02 Heat pumps in central heating systems using heat accumulated in storage masses
F24D 15/04 Heat pumps in other domestic- or space-heating systems
F24D 17/02 Heat pumps in domestic hot-water supply systems
F24H 4/00 Air or water heaters using heat pumps
F25B 30/00 Heat pumps
Using waste heat
F01K 27/00 To produce mechanical energy
F01K 23/06-23/10, F01N
5/00, F02G 5/00-5/04,
F25B 27/02
Of combustion engines
F01K 17/00;23/04 steam engine plants
F02C 6/18 Of gas-turbine plants
F25B 27/02 As source of energy for refrigeration plants
C02F 1/16 For treatment of water, waste water or sewage
D21F 5/20 Recovery of waste heat in paper production
F22B 1/02 For steam generation by exploitation of the heat content of hot heat carriers
F23G 5/46 Recuperation of heat energy from waste incineration
F24F 12/00 Energy recovery in air conditioning
F27D 17/00 Arrangements for using waste heat from furnaces, kilns, ovens or retorts
F28D 17/00-20/00 Regenerative heat-exchange apparatus
C10J 3/86 Of gasification plants
F03G 5/00-5/08 Devices for producing mechanical power from muscle energy
Source: IPC Green Inventory, World Intellectual Property Organization.
Table B.6: Patent classes for electricity storage.
IPC code Description
B60K 6/28 Characterized by the electric energy storing means, e.g. batteries or capacitors
B60W 10/26 For electrical energy, e.g. batteries or capacitors
H01M 10/44 Methods for charging or discharging
H01M 10/46 Accumulators structurally combined with charging apparatus
H01G 9/155 Hybrid capacitors, i.e. capacitors having different positive and negative electrodes;
Electric double-layer [EDL] capacitors; Processes for the manufacture thereof or parts
thereof
H02J 3/28 Arrangements for balancing the load in a network by storage of energy
H02J 7/00 Circuit arrangements for charging or depolarizing batteries or for supplying loads from
batteries
H02J 15/00 Systems for storing electric energy
Source: IPC Green Inventory, World Intellectual Property Organization.
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Table B.7: Total number of patents in renewable technologies following different
International Patent Classification (IPC) codes.
Technology Literature WIPO - Green Inventory
Renewables 84,135 178,841
Geothermal 1,156 2,123
Hydro 0 6,337
Natural heat 0 2,351
Solar 21,001 59,905
Thermal 0 43
Waste 0 27,361
Waste heat 0 2,326
Wind 5,778 5,770
Fuel cells 0 71,801
Biomass 0 808
Muscle energy 0 16
Biomass and waste 54,871 0
Note: Literature refers to classification codes provided by Johnstone et al. (2010)
while Table B.5 reports WIPO - Green Inventory codes.
Table B.7 reports the total number of patents in renewable technologies following
two different classifications: WIPO’s IPC Green Inventory and Johnstone et al.
(2010) (labelled Literature). Our baseline estimates are based on the more ex-
tensive WIPO list of codes which totals 178, 841 patents, in contrast to the list
often used in the literature that contains 84, 135 patents. The main difference
in the patent count comes from fuel cells. Fuel cells provide electrical energy by
activating a fuel to convert it into electricity. They generate about 0.6 Volts to
0.9 Volts DC per cell but they do not storage energy like batteries. Thus, they
are an important source of renewable electricity generation.
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Figure B.1: Firm count by country for top-25 countries.
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C Robustness analysis
C.1 Conventional electricity generation technologies
Table C.1: Baseline model including all conventional technologies (general and efficiency-
improving).
Dependent variable: firm-level patents
All countries Top five countries
Renewable Conventional Storage Renewable Conventional Storage
Internal knowledge (marginal effects):
L2.Storage .01108∗∗ .00378 -.00768∗ .01094∗∗ .00373 -.00715∗∗
(.0036) (.00419) (.003) (.00385) (.00417) (.00257)
L2.Renewable -.00195∗ -.00161 .002∗∗ -.00179∗ -.00132 .00195∗∗
(.00077) (.00121) (.00048) (.00078) (.00125) (.00051)
L2.Conventional -.0004 .00013 -.0009∗ -.00043 .00017 -.00091∗
(.00035) (.00016) (.00045) (.00037) (.00014) (.00044)
External knowledge:
L2.Storage .00036∗ -.00015 -6.9e-05 .00013 -.00038 -.00051†
(.00017) (.00018) (.00025) (.00021) (.00029) (.00029)
L2.Renewable -9.7e-05∗∗ 7.0e-06 1.1e-05 -6.7e-05∗ 1.8e-05 7.5e-05
(2.6e-05) (3.3e-05) (4.7e-05) (2.9e-05) (4.7e-05) (4.8e-05)
L2.Convetional 8.4e-06 -3.0e-05 -4.6e-05 -1.3e-05 -5.0e-05 -9.1e-05∗
(2.2e-05) (2.6e-05) (3.7e-05) (2.8e-05) (4.2e-05) (4.3e-05)
Energy prices (firm level):
L1.Coal -.3036∗ -.3202† -.2783 -.4411∗ .03585 -.3648
(.1438) (.1852) (.2326) (.176) (.2925) (.3279)
L1.Electricity .2241 .3267 .1688 .2186 .1089 .1328
(.1727) (.2136) (.2349) (.2089) (.2915) (.3278)
Economic controls (firm level):
L1.GDP .01547 .03082 .09653 -.06237 -.1625 .08463
(.08195) (.1016) (.1406) (.09291) (.1975) (.2862)
L1.GDPcap 1.637∗ .6414 .08797 .8085 .3257 -1.876∗
(.6425) (.5549) (.8495) (.7236) (1.09) (.8001)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year x Country FE No No No No No No
Number of observations 51246 34498 12051 40946 27657 10335
Significance levels: ∗∗: 1% ∗: 5% †: 10%
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C.2 Lag structure
Table C.2: Baseline model using one-year lags (L1).
Dependent variable: firm-level patents
All countries Top five countries
Renewable Conventional Storage Renewable Conventional Storage
Internal knowledge (marginal effects):
L1.Storage .0087∗∗ .00782∗ -.00598∗ .00839∗∗ .00834∗ -.00527∗
(.00305) (.00357) (.00241) (.00314) (.00381) (.00225)
L1.Renewable -.00038 .00031 .00231∗∗ -.00022 .00039 .00212∗∗
(.00055) (.00162) (.00053) (.00056) (.00157) (.00056)
L1.Convetional -.00254 .00283 -.00095 -.00285 .00376† -.0003
(.00242) (.00205) (.00597) (.00255) (.00223) (.00611)
External knowledge:
L1.Storage .00037∗∗ -.00032 .00022 .00029∗ -.00039 1.3e-07
(.00012) (.00022) (.00016) (.00013) (.00024) (.00017)
L1.Renewable -.0001∗∗ 1.9e-05 -6.8e-05† -9.3e-05∗∗ 1.4e-05 -1.8e-05
(2.3e-05) (5.2e-05) (4.0e-05) (2.8e-05) (5.4e-05) (5.1e-05)
L1.Convetional 6.5e-05 -.00021∗ -7.9e-05 2.0e-05 -.00019† -.00018†
(4.1e-05) (.0001) (8.5e-05) (4.6e-05) (.00011) (9.1e-05)
Energy prices (firm level):
L1.Coal -.3612∗ -.7419∗∗ -.1597 -.479∗ -.5801∗ -.2705
(.1542) (.2091) (.2301) (.2067) (.2691) (.3201)
L1.Electricity .05351 .1378 .1872 .1001 .4268 .3435
(.1913) (.2743) (.2464) (.2291) (.3228) (.3422)
Economic controls (firm level):
L1.GDP .02071 -.2103∗∗ .3644∗ -.04214 -.1897† .4269
(.0774) (.06848) (.1442) (.08675) (.1069) (.2832)
L1.GDPcap 1.734∗∗ .3901 .2967 1.101 .8421 -1.746
(.6058) (.7248) (.7866) (.7724) (1.254) (1.102)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year x Country FE No No No No No No
Number of observations 43038 11912 10838 34674 9582 9376
Significance levels: ∗∗: 1% ∗: 5% †: 10%
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Table C.3: Baseline model using three-year lags (L3).
Dependent variable: firm-level patents
All countries Top five countries
Renewable Conventional Storage Renewable Conventional Storage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Internal knowledge (marginal effects):
L3.Storage .0112∗∗ .00672∗ -.00954∗∗ .01127∗∗ .00649∗ -.00865∗∗
(.00322) (.00317) (.0036) (.00348) (.00324) (.00319)
L3.Renewable -.00307∗∗ -.00068 .0014∗ -.00281∗∗ .00022 .00141∗
(.001) (.0019) (.00057) (.00101) (.00165) (.00061)
L3.Convetional -.00466† -.00123 -.00264 -.00494† -.00174 -.0023
(.00274) (.00209) (.00432) (.00286) (.00268) (.00427)
External knowledge:
L3.Storage .00034∗∗ -.00043† .00022 .00022 -.0004 -4.0e-05
(.00013) (.00024) (.00015) (.00014) (.00026) (.00014)
L3.Renewable -.0001∗∗ 5.9e-05 -2.7e-05 -8.4e-05∗∗ 6.4e-05 2.3e-05
(2.4e-05) (5.3e-05) (3.1e-05) (2.8e-05) (6.0e-05) (2.7e-05)
L3.Convetional 8.0e-05 -.0002† -1.4e-05 6.0e-05 -.00017 -9.3e-05
(5.5e-05) (.0001) (8.6e-05) (6.3e-05) (.00014) (9.1e-05)
Energy prices (firm level):
L1.Coal -.2683∗ -.6973∗∗ -.293 -.4375∗∗ -.7637∗∗ -.5457
(.1291) (.2021) (.2261) (.1654) (.2274) (.3395)
L1.Electricity .1729 .02914 .2924 .1836 .3914 .3117
(.1813) (.2636) (.2242) (.2237) (.2777) (.3038)
Economic controls (firm level):
L1.GDP .0228 -.1794† .1773 -.1282 -.3249∗∗ .249
(.09481) (.103) (.1141) (.1036) (.1103) (.2024)
L1.GDPcap 1.414∗ -.1419 -.01467 .926 .7492 -1.864∗
(.6875) (.9536) (.7065) (.7848) (.9957) (.9496)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year x Country FE No No No No No No
Number of observations 59266 14133 13235 47017 11312 11266
Significance levels: ∗∗: 1% ∗: 5% †: 10%
50
C.3 Patent selection
Table C.4: Estimates using the list of renewable energy patents compiled by Johnstone
et al. (2010).
Dependent variable: firm-level patents
All countries Top five countries
Renewable Conventional Storage Renewable Conventional Storage
Internal knowledge (marginal effects):
L2.Storage .0037 .00508† -.00499† .00369 .00534† -.00416†
(.00484) (.00295) (.00274) (.00501) (.00294) (.00246)
L2.Renewable -.00021 -.00283∗∗ -.00016 -.00016 -.00323∗∗ 9.9e-05
(.00066) (.00107) (.00171) (.00064) (.00123) (.00176)
L2.Convetional -.00598† .00048 .00419 -.00651† .00205 .00447
(.00363) (.00224) (.00658) (.00375) (.00262) (.00642)
External knowledge:
L2.Storage -.00011 -8.1e-05 6.6e-05 -.0001 -6.8e-06 2.0e-05
(.00012) (.00012) (1.0e-04) (.00014) (.00018) (.00011)
L2.Renewable -6.2e-05∗ 1.2e-06 -3.9e-05 -5.5e-05† -1.8e-05 -1.1e-05
(2.7e-05) (3.3e-05) (3.1e-05) (3.0e-05) (3.7e-05) (3.2e-05)
L2.Convetional 2.0e-05 -5.2e-05 8.7e-05 -6.7e-06 .00011 3.7e-05
(6.1e-05) (.0001) (9.2e-05) (6.7e-05) (.00012) (.00011)
Energy prices (firm level):
L1.Coal -.329 -.5509∗∗ -.1714 -.4832 -.5167∗ -.1954
(.2764) (.1927) (.2632) (.334) (.215) (.3753)
L1.Electricity .1664 .05317 .4788† .1794 .3612 .5122
(.2507) (.2759) (.2763) (.3292) (.2862) (.3667)
Economic controls (firm level):
L1.GDP .04161 -.1193 .4113∗∗ -.08723 -.09084 .09126
(.1013) (.1104) (.134) (.1861) (.128) (.1894)
L1.GDPcap .7902 .98 .07536 .4518 1.644 -.8824
(.7377) (.822) (.6809) (1.017) (1.179) (.6971)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year x Country FE No No No No No No
Number of observations 28570 12254 10394 22376 9837 8901
Significance levels: ∗∗: 1% ∗: 5% †: 10%
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C.4 Firm size
Table C.5: Baseline model including only the most innovative firms (15% of sample).
Dependent variable: firm-level patents
All countries Top five countries
Renewable Conventional Storage Renewable Conventional Storage
Internal knowledge (marginal effects):
L2.Storage .01078∗∗ .00666∗ -.00719∗∗ .01064∗∗ .00671∗ -.0063∗∗
(.00375) (.0031) (.00258) (.00396) (.00313) (.00235)
L2.Renewable -.00144∗ 1.4e-05 .00212∗∗ -.00137† .00031 .00194∗∗
(.0007) (.00165) (.00053) (.00071) (.00153) (.00057)
L2.Conventional -.00365 .00114 -.00079 -.00383 .00126 -.0005
(.00245) (.00208) (.00538) (.00258) (.00253) (.00532)
External knowledge:
L2.Storage .0004∗∗ -8.0e-05 .00034∗ .00028∗ -2.3e-05 .0002
(.00013) (.00022) (.00016) (.00014) (.00027) (.00016)
L2.Renewable -8.8e-05∗∗ -1.7e-05 -5.2e-05† -8.5e-05∗∗ -2.2e-05 -4.1e-05
(2.1e-05) (4.9e-05) (3.0e-05) (2.4e-05) (6.0e-05) (3.1e-05)
L2.Convetional .00011† -.00014 5.4e-05 5.1e-05 -7.0e-05 -3.1e-05
(5.9e-05) (.00014) (.0001) (6.8e-05) (.00018) (.00011)
Energy prices (firm level):
L1.Coal -.3066† -.5349∗ -.2658 -.4706∗ -.5884∗ -.4258
(.1636) (.2635) (.2474) (.2034) (.2553) (.3563)
L1.Electricity .1552 -.0036 .09723 .172 .3251 .295
(.2164) (.292) (.2701) (.2542) (.3168) (.3789)
Economic controls (firm level):
L1.GDP -.132 -.1521 .03701 -.2779∗ -.2459 -.00556
(.09893) (.09577) (.107) (.113) (.1788) (.2222)
L1.GDPcap 1.784∗∗ .5144 .4678 1.223 1.463 -.5979
(.6517) (.5709) (.7666) (.7553) (1.351) (1.146)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year x Country FE No No No No No No
Number of observations 17324 6916 7367 14784 5717 6477
Significance levels: ∗∗: 1% ∗: 5% †: 10%
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C.5 Alternative measures of regional spillovers
Table C.6: Alternative specification of regional spillovers: Countries.
Dependent variable: firm-level patents
All countries Top five countries
Renewable Conventional Storage Renewable Conventional Storage
Internal knowledge (marginal effects):
L2.Storage .01158∗∗ .00759∗ -.00726∗ .01131∗∗ .00785∗ -.00654∗
(.00381) (.00305) (.00294) (.00402) (.00323) (.00266)
L2.Renewable -.00183∗ -.00041 .00199∗∗ -.00167∗ -.00051 .00178∗∗
(.00078) (.00167) (.00053) (.0008) (.00168) (.00056)
L2.Convetional -.00378 .00087 5.9e-05 -.00398 .0024 .0003
(.00254) (.00234) (.0058) (.00268) (.00269) (.00566)
External knowledge:
L2.Storage .00025† -.0003 .00025 .00014 -.00035 .00015
(.00015) (.00024) (.00021) (.00015) (.0003) (.00021)
L2.Renewable -4.5e-05∗ 5.8e-05 -7.5e-05† -1.4e-05 6.4e-05 -3.9e-05
(2.3e-05) (4.8e-05) (4.3e-05) (2.1e-05) (6.7e-05) (4.4e-05)
L2.Convetional -2.8e-05 -.00025 .00021 -.00015 -.00028 .00011
(9.3e-05) (.00018) (.00016) (9.5e-05) (.00024) (.00017)
Energy prices (firm level):
L1.Coal -.3017† -.7541∗∗ -.1301 -.5187∗∗ -.6821∗∗ -.3142
(.1563) (.2142) (.2384) (.1902) (.2497) (.3258)
L1.Electricity .1425 .1295 .02513 .2489 .4588 .3097
(.1951) (.2985) (.2501) (.2329) (.3634) (.3391)
Economic controls (firm level):
L1.GDP -.01794 -.2074∗∗ .2434† -.1946∗ -.2144 .3667
(.08763) (.07892) (.1404) (.09562) (.1331) (.331)
L1.GDPcap 1.216† .5505 -.1616 .5788 .9911 -2.013
(.6767) (.8164) (.8601) (.7904) (1.223) (1.609)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year x Country FE No No No No No No
Number of observations 51246 13059 12050 40978 10473 10342
Significance levels: ∗∗: 1% ∗: 5% †: 10%
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Table C.7: Alternative specification of regional spillovers: FIFA regions.
Dependent variable: firm-level patents
All countries Top five countries
Renewable Conventional Storage Renewable Conventional Storage
Internal knowledge (marginal effects):
L2.Storage .01116∗∗ .00686∗ -.00741∗ .01114∗∗ .00736∗ -.00669∗
(.00375) (.00294) (.00293) (.00401) (.00318) (.00262)
L2.Renewable -.0019∗ -.00039 .00188∗∗ -.00174∗ -.00035 .00177∗∗
(.00077) (.00175) (.00053) (.00078) (.00176) (.00057)
L2.Convetional -.00375 .00087 -.00038 -.00386 .00266 -7.7e-05
(.00254) (.00235) (.00575) (.00266) (.00267) (.00564)
External knowledge:
L2.Storage .00036∗∗ -.00011 .0003† .00022 -.0002 2.8e-05
(.00013) (.0002) (.00016) (.00014) (.00024) (.00016)
L2.Renewable -9.8e-05∗∗ -1.6e-05 -7.1e-05∗ -8.3e-05∗∗ -2.3e-05 -2.9e-05
(2.4e-05) (4.2e-05) (3.5e-05) (2.5e-05) (4.6e-05) (3.9e-05)
L2.Convetional 6.1e-05 -9.6e-05 4.4e-05 -2.7e-06 -8.7e-05 -7.5e-05
(6.1e-05) (.00013) (9.1e-05) (6.8e-05) (.00015) (.0001)
Energy prices (firm level):
L1.Coal -.2735† -.7506∗∗ -.1867 -.4392∗ -.68∗∗ -.3068
(.1414) (.208) (.2274) (.1849) (.2304) (.3231)
L1.Electricity .1039 .1104 .1457 .08632 .4006 .2157
(.1871) (.2913) (.2381) (.229) (.3564) (.3414)
Economic controls (firm level):
L1.GDP -.055 -.2108∗∗ .2005 -.2452∗ -.2148† .4266
(.08738) (.07962) (.1403) (.0976) (.1306) (.3796)
L1.GDPcap 1.566∗ .6528 .3344 .8978 1.111 -2.487
(.6779) (.8132) (.9642) (.7553) (1.272) (1.714)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year x Country FE No No No No No No
Number of observations 51246 13059 12050 40978 10473 10342
Significance levels: ∗∗: 1% ∗: 5% †: 10%
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Table C.8: Alternative specification of regional spillovers: Global.
Dependent variable: firm-level patents
All countries Top five countries
Renewable Conventional Storage Renewable Conventional Storage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Internal knowledge (marginal effects):
L2.Storage .01195∗∗ .00676∗ -.01041∗∗ .01226∗∗ .00715† -.01026∗∗
(.0037) (.00327) (.00276) (.00395) (.00365) (.00264)
L2.Renewable -.00188∗ -.00153 .0045∗ -.00171∗ -.00032 .00377†
(.00083) (.00258) (.00176) (.00084) (.00254) (.00208)
L2.Convetional -.00304 .01483 -.03032 -.00306 -.0025 -.0207
(.0026) (.03307) (.02294) (.00274) (.03796) (.0277)
External knowledge:
L2.Storage .00038 -.00022 -.00299∗∗ .00042 -.00014 -.0036∗∗
(.00032) (.00164) (.00095) (.00036) (.00204) (.00106)
L2.Renewable -7.3e-05∗ -.00095 .00249 -8.0e-05∗ .0003 .00195
(2.8e-05) (.00239) (.00161) (3.1e-05) (.00284) (.00191)
L2.Conventional .00033∗∗ .01399 -.03036 .00035∗∗ -.00478 -.02099
(5.2e-05) (.03262) (.02262) (6.3e-05) (.03764) (.0272)
Energy prices (firm level):
L1.Coal -.00024 -.7595∗∗ -.1975 -.00056 -.7645∗∗ -.3041
(.1539) (.2046) (.246) (.203) (.252) (.3403)
L1.Electricity 1.8e-05 .163 .1004 2.3e-05 .5376 .3132
(.1831) (.3031) (.2367) (.2245) (.4023) (.3219)
Economic controls (firm level):
L1.GDP 2.5e-05 -.2181∗∗ .1826 -.00017 -.2371† .4384
(.08918) (.08083) (.1498) (.1441) (.1332) (.387)
L1.GDPcap 3.2e-05 .7685 -.00104 3.5e-07 1.392 -2.67
(.7208) (.8106) (.9677) (.9395) (1.252) (1.747)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year x Country FE No No No No No No
Number of observations 51246 13059 12050 40978 10473 10342
Significance levels: ∗∗: 1% ∗: 5% †: 10%
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C.6 Alternative specification of energy prices
Table C.9: Alternative specification of fossil fuel price: Natural gas price.
Dependent variable: firm-level patents
All countries Top five countries
Renewable Conventional Storage Renewable Conventional Storage
Internal knowledge (marginal effects):
L2.Storage .01106∗∗ .00759∗ -.00767∗∗ .01123∗∗ .00788∗ -.00699∗∗
(.00374) (.003) (.00294) (.00401) (.00326) (.00253)
L2.Renewable -.00184∗ -.00048 .00192∗∗ -.00172∗ -.00043 .0018∗∗
(.00078) (.00168) (.00053) (.00079) (.00176) (.00056)
L2.Convetional -.00378 .00114 -.00035 -.0039 .00268 -.00011
(.00256) (.00226) (.00569) (.00268) (.00274) (.00552)
External knowledge:
L2.Storage .00023† -6.8e-05 1.0e-05 .00019 -.00014 -.00023
(.00012) (.00018) (.00019) (.00014) (.00019) (.00022)
L2.Renewable -7.7e-05∗∗ -2.8e-05 -1.3e-05 -8.4e-05∗∗ -3.7e-05 7.9e-06
(2.0e-05) (3.7e-05) (3.5e-05) (2.3e-05) (3.7e-05) (4.2e-05)
L2.Convetional 5.3e-05 -.00012 1.7e-06 -4.5e-06 -.0001 -9.8e-05
(5.8e-05) (.00012) (9.2e-05) (6.8e-05) (.00016) (.0001)
Energy prices (firm level):
L1.Natural gas -.1685 .189 -.4785† .0281 .235 -.5259
(.123) (.1764) (.2719) (.1448) (.3327) (.3263)
L1.Electricity .1757 -.09767 .4425 -.05359 -.05087 .5905
(.2216) (.2729) (.2694) (.2815) (.3661) (.4413)
Economic controls (firm level):
L1.GDP -.0246 -.08822 .2078 -.144 -.1602 .3921
(.0829) (.1054) (.1357) (.09399) (.1282) (.3241)
L1.GDPcap 1.501∗ .9339 -.06481 .8537 1.24 -2.289
(.6602) (.7158) (.8608) (.764) (1.194) (1.562)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year x Country FE No No No No No No
Number of observations 51246 13059 12050 40978 10473 10342
Significance levels: ∗∗: 1% ∗: 5% †: 10%
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Table C.10: Alternative specification of fossil fuel price: Oil price.
Dependent variable: firm-level patents
All countries Top five countries
Renewable Conventional Storage Renewable Conventional Storage
Internal knowledge (marginal effects):
L2.Storage .01144∗∗ .00767∗ -.00755∗ .01138∗∗ .00727∗ -.00666∗
(.00374) (.00308) (.00307) (.00398) (.00306) (.00276)
L2.Renewable -.00188∗ -.00052 .00194∗∗ -.00173∗ -8.7e-05 .00181∗∗
(.00077) (.00167) (.00053) (.00079) (.00166) (.00057)
L2.Conventional -.00374 .0011 -.00031 -.00394 .00118 7.5e-05
(.00255) (.00221) (.00573) (.00267) (.00271) (.00566)
External knowledge:
L2.Storage .00036∗∗ -9.0e-05 .0002 .00025† -.0001 -3.5e-06
(.00012) (.0002) (.00014) (.00013) (.00025) (.00015)
L2.Renewable -9.3e-05∗∗ -1.8e-05 -4.1e-05 -8.9e-05∗∗ -2.3e-05 -1.7e-05
(2.1e-05) (4.3e-05) (2.6e-05) (2.5e-05) (5.8e-05) (2.7e-05)
L2.Conventional 9.6e-05† -.00011 4.5e-05 4.6e-05 -3.3e-05 -3.6e-05
(5.3e-05) (.00012) (8.6e-05) (6.2e-05) (.00016) (9.3e-05)
Energy prices (firm level):
L1.Oil .2929∗ .2878 -.07955 .3106 -.1732 -.5122
(.1489) (.2514) (.2683) (.2079) (.3798) (.3641)
L1.Electricity -.03835 -.1894 .09068 -.09617 .1307 .4501
(.2273) (.2515) (.2474) (.2865) (.371) (.3619)
Economic controls (firm level):
L1.GDP -.00234 -.01692 .06382 -.09664 -.2544 .03722
(.07749) (.1055) (.07215) (.09102) (.1619) (.1439)
L1.GDPcap 1.611∗∗ .7713 .3937 .9579 1.936† -.6743
(.5578) (.5507) (.627) (.699) (1.116) (.7391)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year x Country FE No No No No No No
Number of observations 51244 13051 12058 40942 10488 10324
Significance levels: ∗∗: 1% ∗: 5% †: 10%
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Table C.11: Baseline model excluding the electricity price.
Dependent variable: firm-level patents
All countries Top five countries
Renewable Conventional Storage Renewable Conventional Storage
Internal knowledge (marginal effects):
L2.Storage .01125∗∗ .00676∗ -.00741∗ .01117∗∗ .00728∗ -.00674∗
(.00377) (.00299) (.00297) (.00403) (.00322) (.00262)
L2.Renewable -.00189∗ -.00034 .00188∗∗ -.00174∗ -.00026 .00178∗∗
(.00077) (.00177) (.00053) (.00078) (.00178) (.00057)
L2.Convetional -.00378 .00087 -.00035 -.0039 .00249 -.0002
(.00253) (.00234) (.00571) (.00266) (.00268) (.00556)
External knowledge:
L2.Storage .00031∗ -.00014 .00021 .00018 -.00023 -2.9e-05
(.00012) (.0002) (.00015) (.00013) (.00024) (.00015)
L2.Renewable -8.8e-05∗∗ -1.8e-05 -4.8e-05 -7.6e-05∗∗ -2.2e-05 -2.2e-05
(2.1e-05) (4.1e-05) (3.4e-05) (2.3e-05) (4.5e-05) (3.5e-05)
L2.Convetional 5.2e-05 -.00013 2.3e-05 -1.6e-05 -.00012 -.00011
(6.0e-05) (.00013) (9.3e-05) (6.8e-05) (.00017) (.0001)
Energy prices (firm level):
L1.Coal -.2468 -.724∗∗ -.1872 -.4072† -.5515∗ -.2896
(.1613) (.2118) (.2301) (.2094) (.2323) (.3368)
Economic controls (firm level):
L1.GDP -.05717 -.2247∗∗ .1757 -.2421∗∗ -.2794∗ .385
(.08122) (.07986) (.1374) (.0918) (.1243) (.3807)
L1.GDPcap 1.586∗ .6899 .3905 .9228 1.279 -2.405
(.6938) (.8689) (.9158) (.8161) (1.278) (1.719)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year x Country FE No No No No No No
Number of observations 51246 13059 12050 40978 10473 10342
Significance levels: ∗∗: 1% ∗: 5% †: 10%
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C.7 Caveats
Table C.12: Fully balanced panel data set and negative binomial regression model.
Dependent variable: firm-level patents
All countries Top five countries
Renewable Conventional Storage Renewable Conventional Storage
Internal knowledge (marginal effects):
L2.Storage .00555∗∗ .00225 .00372∗ .00331∗∗ .00223 .00323∗
(.00107) (.00173) (.00147) (.0011) (.00172) (.00154)
L2.Renewable .00687∗∗ .00648∗∗ .00402∗∗ .00654∗∗ .00593∗∗ .00359∗∗
(.0002) (.00044) (.00034) (.0002) (.00045) (.00035)
L2.Conventional .00247∗∗ .00485∗∗ -.00355∗ .00062 .00619∗∗ -.00315∗
(.00064) (.00067) (.00139) (.00065) (.00084) (.00142)
External knowledge:
L2.Storage .00037∗∗ 7.6e-05 .0005∗∗ -1.4e-05 -.00031∗∗ -1.6e-05
(2.4e-05) (6.9e-05) (6.0e-05) (3.2e-05) (8.9e-05) (8.2e-05)
L2.Renewable -4.9e-05∗∗ 1.2e-06 -7.1e-05∗∗ 3.6e-05∗∗ 7.3e-05∗∗ 1.9e-05
(4.5e-06) (1.2e-05) (1.2e-05) (6.7e-06) (1.7e-05) (2.0e-05)
L.Convetional 1.0e-06 -.00011∗∗ 3.0e-06 -.00011∗∗ -.00023∗∗ -.00023∗∗
(1.3e-05) (3.5e-05) (3.6e-05) (2.2e-05) (5.7e-05) (5.9e-05)
Energy prices (firm level):
L1.Coal -.3471∗∗ -.4294∗∗ -.5504∗∗ -.5886∗∗ -.5601∗∗ -.5843∗∗
(.02761) (.06589) (.07786) (.05209) (.1317) (.1384)
L1.Electricity .101∗∗ -.01547 .3786∗∗ .1366∗ .2305 .2211
(.02872) (.06809) (.07401) (.06004) (.1414) (.1538)
Economic controls (firm level):
L1.GDP -.041∗∗ -.184∗∗ -.1506∗∗ -.7243∗∗ -.7274∗∗ -.6438∗∗
(.01299) (.0279) (.03729) (.03345) (.07048) (.1045)
L1.GDPcap .55∗∗ .1689 .9747∗∗ 1.229∗∗ .8156 -.7104
(.06415) (.1386) (.1938) (.2467) (.6347) (.5758)
Constant -8.663∗∗ -2.815† -11.88∗∗ -5.629∗ -2.764 14.69∗
(.6797) (1.499) (1.988) (2.583) (6.372) (6.162)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year x Country FE No No No No No No
Number of observations 271596 42396 41396 207589 33230 33503
Significance levels: ∗∗: 1% ∗: 5% †: 10%
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Table C.13: Fully balanced panel data set and negative binomial regression model including
all conventional patents (general and efficiency-improving).
Dependent variable: firm-level patents
All countries Top five countries
Renewable Conventional Storage Renewable Conventional Storage
Internal knowledge (marginal effects):
L2.Storage .00575∗∗ .00982 .00403∗∗ .00302∗∗ .00227 .00308∗
(.00106) (.00637) (.00145) (.0011) (.00142) (.00153)
L2.Renewable .00681∗∗ .0009 .00378∗∗ .00647∗∗ .00596∗∗ .00352∗∗
(.0002) (.00169) (.00034) (.0002) (.00029) (.00035)
L2.Conventional .0004∗∗ .00423∗∗ -.00018 .00013 .0013∗∗ -.00029
(8.2e-05) (.00122) (.00018) (8.9e-05) (9.3e-05) (.00019)
External knowledge:
L2.Storage .00037∗∗ .00013 .00055∗∗ -5.4e-05 -.00011 -.00035∗
(3.7e-05) (.00032) (9.6e-05) (5.9e-05) (7.5e-05) (.00017)
L2.Convetional -5.0e-05∗∗ -8.0e-05 -8.0e-05∗∗ 4.8e-05∗∗ 6.2e-05∗∗ 8.4e-05∗
(7.1e-06) (5.1e-05) (1.9e-05) (1.1e-05) (1.4e-05) (3.4e-05)
L2.Regionspillover d 8.8e-07 -9.9e-05∗∗ 6.5e-06 -1.8e-05∗∗ -3.2e-05∗∗ -7.4e-05∗∗
(3.5e-06) (2.1e-05) (9.8e-06) (6.9e-06) (8.6e-06) (2.0e-05)
Energy prices (firm level):
L1.Coal -.3559∗∗ -1.096 -.5748∗∗ -.5549∗∗ -.4278∗∗ -.5386∗∗
(.02822) (.) (.07944) (.0528) (.06986) (.1427)
L1.Electricity .116∗∗ -1.511 .4168∗∗ .1631∗∗ .1078 .2509
(.02879) (.) (.07443) (.06008) (.077) (.1539)
Economic controls (firm level):
L1.GDP -.04745∗∗ 1.088∗∗ -.1587∗∗ -.7809∗∗ -.8244∗∗ -.6693∗∗
(.0132) (.04617) (.03785) (.0355) (.04229) (.09929)
L1.GDPcap .5548∗∗ -6.723∗∗ 1.003∗∗ 1.349∗∗ 2.541∗∗ -.5933
(.06391) (.07846) (.1941) (.2412) (.357) (.5783)
Constant -8.673∗∗ 71.53 -12.23∗∗ -6.553∗ -19.77∗∗ 13.78∗
(.6757) (.) (1.981) (2.586) (3.655) (6.343)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year x Country FE No No No No No No
Number of observations 271594 160629 41423 207544 123313 33465
Significance levels: ∗∗: 1% ∗: 5% †: 10%
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Table C.14: Sub-sample of the twelve most innovative countries.
Dependent variable: firm-level patents
All countries Top twelve countries
Renewable Conventional Storage Renewable Conventional Storage
Internal knowledge (marginal effects):
L2.Storage .01123∗∗ .00682∗ -.00754∗ .01116∗∗ .00708∗ -.00725∗
(.00376) (.00306) (.00302) (.00378) (.00295) (.00296)
L2.Renewable -.00188∗ -.00042 .00191∗∗ -.00182∗ -.00027 .00187∗∗
(.00078) (.00175) (.00053) (.00077) (.0016) (.00053)
L2.Conventional -.00378 .00082 -.00034 -.00383 .00106 -.00042
(.00254) (.00223) (.00575) (.00258) (.00207) (.00568)
External knowledge:
L2.Storage .00034∗∗ -9.5e-05 .00023 .00033∗∗ -4.2e-05 .0003∗
(.00012) (.00021) (.00014) (.00012) (.00022) (.00015)
L2.Convetional -8.7e-05∗∗ -1.9e-05 -4.3e-05† -8.6e-05∗∗ -4.2e-06 -5.6e-05∗
(2.0e-05) (4.7e-05) (2.6e-05) (2.3e-05) (4.6e-05) (2.8e-05)
L2.Regionspillover d 1.0e-04† -.0001 4.4e-05 9.0e-05 -2.7e-05 6.6e-05
(5.4e-05) (.00012) (8.6e-05) (6.1e-05) (.00013) (8.9e-05)
Energy prices (firm level):
L1.Coal -.3012∗ -.5945∗ -.2324 -.298∗ -.8182∗∗ -.1834
(.1422) (.2467) (.2289) (.1437) (.219) (.2399)
L1.Electricity .1638 .00831 .09989 .117 .3491 .1532
(.1974) (.2714) (.2405) (.2141) (.2413) (.2647)
Economic controls (firm level):
L1.GDP -.107 -.1618† .01759 -.1805† -.156† .1096
(.08953) (.08629) (.09268) (.09912) (.08395) (.1594)
L1.GDPcap 1.665∗∗ .496 .4916 1.696∗ .8272† 1.068
(.6027) (.4841) (.6449) (.7317) (.4787) (.9429)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year x Country FE No No No No No No
Number of observations 51244 13051 12058 47474 12114 11548
Significance levels: ∗∗: 1% ∗: 5% †: 10%
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Table C.15: Baseline model with presample history.
Dependent variable: firm-level patents
All countries Top twelve countries
Renewable Conventional Storage Renewable Conventional Storage
Internal knowledge (marginal effects):
L2.Storage .01123∗∗ .00682∗ -.00754∗ .01118∗∗ .00703∗ -.00646∗
(.00376) (.00306) (.00302) (.00401) (.00308) (.00269)
L2.Renewable -.00188∗ -.00042 .00191∗∗ -.00172∗ -3.3e-05 .00176∗∗
(.00078) (.00175) (.00053) (.00079) (.00162) (.00057)
L2.Conventional -.00378 .00082 -.00034 -.00392 .00108 1.0e-05
(.00254) (.00223) (.00575) (.00265) (.00266) (.00565)
External knowledge:
L2.Storage .00034∗∗ -9.5e-05 .00023 .00023† -4.5e-05 .00012
(.00012) (.00021) (.00014) (.00013) (.00025) (.00015)
L2.Convetional -8.7e-05∗∗ -1.9e-05 -4.3e-05† -7.9e-05∗∗ -2.2e-05 -3.0e-05
(2.0e-05) (4.7e-05) (2.6e-05) (2.3e-05) (5.6e-05) (2.6e-05)
L2.Regionspillover d 1.0e-04† -.0001 4.4e-05 5.2e-05 -9.4e-06 -1.9e-05
(5.4e-05) (.00012) (8.6e-05) (6.2e-05) (.00016) (9.3e-05)
Energy prices (firm level):
L1.Coal -.3012∗ -.5945∗ -.2324 -.4605∗∗ -.6607∗∗ -.3823
(.1422) (.2467) (.2289) (.1765) (.241) (.3242)
L1.Electricity .1638 .00831 .09989 .1872 .3222 .3113
(.1974) (.2714) (.2405) (.2379) (.2987) (.3406)
Economic controls (firm level):
L1.GDP -.107 -.1618† .01759 -.2573∗ -.2863† .02906
(.08953) (.08629) (.09268) (.1001) (.1565) (.205)
L1.GDPcap 1.665∗∗ .496 .4916 1.133 1.646 -.4367
(.6027) (.4841) (.6449) (.7172) (1.18) (1.04)
Presample history:
Renewable -32.91∗∗ 8 8.073 -21.85∗∗ 4.775 16.36
(10.39) (10.33) (.) (6.128) (27.75) (47.1)
Conventional 3248∗∗ 7.707 9977 6921∗∗ -1.401 -115.1
(20.3) (27.34) (.) (33.63) (991.9) (182.5)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year x Country FE No No No No No No
Number of observations 51244 13051 12058 40942 10488 10324
Significance levels: ∗∗: 1% ∗: 5% †: 10%
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